

S. T. COLERIDGE'S
TREATISE ON METHOD

Coleridgeana

COLERIDGE MEMORIAL VOLUME

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S. T. COLERIDGE'S
TREATISE ON METHOD

AS PUBLISHED IN
THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA

EDITED

WITH INTRODUCTION, MANUSCRIPT FRAGMENTS,
AND NOTES FOR A COMPLETE COLLATION WITH
THE ESSAYS ON METHOD IN "THE FRIEND"

BY
ALICE D. SNYDER
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INTRODUCTION

I. THE OCCASION OF THE TREATISE AND ITS SUBSEQUENT STATUS

AMONG the most dramatic of Coleridge's intellectual adventures was his entry into the world of encyclopædists in the year 1817. At this time he was established at Highgate under the care of Dr. James Gillman, in surroundings that bade fair to make consecutive work possible; the *Biographia Literaria* and the *Sibylline Leaves* were off his hands; the reconstruction of *The Friend* was under way. And in August of that year arrangements were all but completed for Coleridge to superintend the publication of a new "methodical" encyclopædia, the *Metropolitana*. He was also to write for it a General Introduction, expounding the classification and ordering of subject-matter that he had proposed, and to contribute the treatise on grammar and the English lexicon.¹ Although he had heaved "a sigh of anguish" over giving up the study and writing that were to issue in his *opus maximum* and hiring himself out as a "job writer and compiler,"² he must have seen in the new work a medium of expression for several of his most ardent interests. For an introductory discussion of method offered an opportunity to present the philosophical principles underlying his general scheme, and in so doing to refute the claims of the scientific mechanists and counteract in some degree the sceptical influence of the French encyclopædists. Even the treatise on grammar he might have constructed with some philosophical as well as philo-

¹ Letter of June 18, 1817; *Lippincott's*, June, 1874, pp. 697-710.

² Letter to Wrangham, June 5, 1817; *Unpublished Letters* (Griggs), II, 196-9.

logical fervour, one would judge from his fragmentary utterances on that subject; and the supreme importance of lexicographical work, properly carried on, he had exclaimed over on various occasions.³

What more could he have desired? It is true that when the scheme broke down, and he was left with only garbled versions of his table of subject-matter and the *Preliminary Treatise on Method* as his published contributions to the work, he minimized his interest in the affair, and even discounted his own ability to project a new encyclopædia.⁴ But the tone in which he made his protestations, recorded in several letters to his friends, betrayed the fact that the matter did lie very close to his heart. The steady income promised would in itself have been an unspeakable boon, but his interest was much more than financial.

How the scheme did break down and how Coleridge stormed over the revisions the publishers had made in his introduction; how he tried to get back his original manuscript, proposing to use it for the third volume of *The Friend*; how he failed, and finally printed there without reference to the *Metropolitana* much of the substance of his introductory treatise—this is a story that has been told in outline many times.⁵ The fact that the version published in the *Encyclopædia* ran into its ninth edition within fifty years of Coleridge's death has sometimes been forgotten.

Although the early contributions to the first edition of the *Metropolitana* were all anonymous, the seven issues

³ See, for example, note to Chap. XII of the *Biographia Literaria* (Shawcross) I, 164-5.

⁴ Letter to Tulk, January 26, 1818; *Unpublished Letters* (Griggs), II, 225-7.

⁵ Cf. Campbell's *Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, p. 227. Further material for the study of Coleridge's relations with the *Encyclopædia* is to be found in the announcements and prefaces of the quarto and cabinet editions of the work, and the editorial notes as well as the text of editions of Coleridge's works listed below, p. xxviii. Cf. also the chapter *Encyclopedist and Educator in Coleridge on Logic and Learning* by the present editor.

of the *Preliminary Treatise* by which the publishers of the second or cabinet edition met the continued demand for the work were all put out in Coleridge's name. But the publication of Coleridge's complaints about the drastic alterations made in his original copy naturally rendered the status of the *Treatise* uncertain.⁶ The problem of authenticity received surprisingly little careful consideration. It seems to have been assumed that Coleridge's own publication of the several essays on method in *The Friend*⁷ disposed of the whole matter, relieving critics of any special responsibility about the earlier printed version. With the recent revival of interest in Coleridge's critical and philosophical writings the situation has changed somewhat: a short time ago T. M. Raysor decided to print both versions of the Shakspearean criticism included in the discussion of method, expressing his opinion that the difference between the text of *The Friend* and the *Treatise* was probably due in no small measure to Coleridge's own re-writing;⁸ and it is significant that J. H. Muirhead, in his volume on *Coleridge as Philosopher*, has quoted quite as a matter of course at least one characteristic and important passage from the *Treatise* that does not occur in *The Friend*. Evidently it is time to challenge certain assumptions about this work, first, that the *Treatise* is essentially the same as the essays on method in *The Friend*, and second, that if the two do show marked differences, *The Friend* contains all that is truly Coleridge's.

⁶ W. G. T. Shedd did not include the *Treatise* in his edition of the *Complete Works*, New York, 1853-84. J. L. Haney, in his *Bibliography of Coleridge*, Philadelphia, 1903, listed it under "Works Including Contributions by Coleridge" (entries 19 and 33) without questioning its authenticity. Thomas J. Wise, in his *Bibliography*, London, 1913, listed it with important notes about the several editions, and stated that the substance of the *Treatise*, "but rewritten and in an entirely amended form (or possibly the original form before the text was 'bedeviled'), was reproduced in *The Friend*, 1818. . . ."

⁷ The so-called Essays on Method, beginning Sec. II, Essay IV.

⁸ *Coleridge's Shakspearean Criticism* (Raysor), II, 342-3.

As an aid to the critical consideration that is now called for, it seems desirable to present, in the following introductory sections, something of the history of the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* and of Coleridge's share in it; and, in the notes and appendix, a collation of his *Preliminary Treatise* with the essays on method in *The Friend*, together with other material bearing on the question of authorship.

II. THE STORY OF THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA

The *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* had an interestingly varied career. The serial publication of the work was commenced by the house of Rest Fenner (formerly Gale and Fenner) that handled several of Coleridge's works. An item in the *London Courier* for December 3, 1817, announced that Part I would be issued January 1, 1818, and items of January 6 and 16 both announced that the work had "this day" been published. A prospectus written in part by Coleridge had been issued some time earlier. At the outset the editors or directors as well as the contributors remained anonymous, though a promise was made to disclose the names after the issue of the first few parts if the public so wished.⁹ Coleridge referred to the directors, facetiously, as the "Et ceteri Club," and the Stationers' Register for this first year shows no proprietors' names other than the house of Rest Fenner. It is evident from Coleridge's correspondence, however, that the work was being directed by the Reverend Thomas Curtis, at the time of Camberwell, and later associated with the Grove House School, Islington, who had had business connections with Gale and Fenner. Subsequently Mr. Curtis spoke of himself as the original editor of the encyclopædia. Sir John Stoddart, whom Coleridge had known as King's Advocate at Malta, had helped compose the prospectus,

⁹ Review of the *Metropolitana*; *Monthly Rev.*, June, 1819.

and contributed two treatises;¹⁰ and Dr. Gregory, undoubtedly Olinthus Gilbert Gregory, at one time the president of the Philosophical Society of London, had at least advised about the scheme of the work.¹¹

Five serial parts were issued by Rest Fenner before the firm's bankruptcy. Later entirely new proprietors took over the encyclopædia and continued its publication, at first anonymously, "under the superintendence of a Gentleman of distinguished and well-known abilities, who succeeded in the arduous task of organizing a large body of eminent writers as regular contributors to its pages."¹² In 1822 the Reverend Edward Smedley, Fellow of Sidney College, Cambridge, was made editor, and he continued to serve until his death in 1836.¹³ After this the direction was taken over by the Reverend Hugh James Rose, for a time principal of King's College, London, and his brother, John Henry Rose, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. These three names appeared on the title-page of the completed edition. The new proprietors, as listed in the Stationers' Register on the completion of the work, were a group of some twenty men, in addition to Benjamin Fellowes, the publisher. They were mostly, though not exclusively, Londoners, and the list includes several names associated with important stationers' firms. The name of the Reverend Thomas Curtis did not appear as editor or proprietor—and for good reason.

For during the early years of this new management Mr. Curtis caused trouble for the *Metropolitana*. He began the publication of the *London Encyclopædia*, announced as by the original editor of the *Metropolitana*, and used so much

¹⁰ Preface to the edition of 1818-45.

¹¹ Letter to Curtis; *Lippincott's*, *loc. cit.*

¹² Volume I of the Fourth Division, editorial note dated 1829.

¹³ Smedley also contributed to the *Penny Cyclopædia*, published by the Society for the Promotion of the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. The two encyclopædias have sometimes been confused.

Logic and the *Rhetoric*), the twenty-eight years of arduous labour that had gone into its making, and the large expenditure of money (£26,000 for authorship, £7,000 for plates, £11,000 for stereotyping the letterpress). And they made a special point of giving Coleridge credit for the original scheme.

So it was that fifteen years after his death Coleridge was hailed as the master-mind behind a successful work that he had once threatened publicly to disown, so disgusted was he at the treatment accorded his plan and his introduction. Whether he would have felt honoured by this recognition after the work had been completed and revised is another open question.

III. COLERIDGE'S SHARE IN THE UNDERTAKING

What, actually, was Coleridge's part in the undertaking? As already stated, he did not superintend the work, nor write for it the treatise on grammar, nor construct the philosophical and historical English lexicon. From the published statements of Campbell, Towle, and others who knew whereof they spoke, it seems clear that the men interested in the encyclopædia did not trust Coleridge to do his work and produce his copy with the promptness that the serial nature of the publication demanded. Nor can they be blamed. They urged him to leave Highgate and live in Camberwell, where, it is assumed, he was to be under the direct eye of Mr. Curtis. Whether his refusal to leave Dr. Gillman's house and his request for a large advance payment were the causes of the breakdown in the arrangements or merely excuses for it is not of special importance. The breakdown did occur. Some of the difficulties were centered in the English lexicon, several sheets of which Coleridge was to have prepared by October 1, 1817, and these difficulties he hoped for a time to over-

come. In a letter dated, unfortunately, only "Monday afternoon," he wrote to Curtis that if the publication of the encyclopædia could be postponed for six months he might come to it a free man—he was behind in his work on *The Friend*—and continued: "Even now, the difference might be conciliated, if the original plan, so strongly urged by Dr. Gregory, were adopted—viz., that of publishing the 4th or Miscellaneous and Lexicographical part after the others, adding the Gazetteer to the former three. If there has been any fundamental difference between us, it has subsisted in this point: that you did not appear to entertain the same deep convictions, as I did and do, respecting 1, the literary; 2, the mercantile importance of the English Lexicon; 3, respecting its difficulty, and the quantum of natural talent and acquired variety of learning requisite for bearing out the promise so distinctly and emphatically given to the public in your prospectus."¹⁹ But he lost his case, and the opening sheets of the English lexicon later attributed to Charles Richardson appeared in the first section published.

One more frustrated hope of Coleridge's was to contribute an article on "animal magnetism," a subject in which he was keenly interested.^{19a} As late as December 1, 1818, he wrote Curtis, reminding him that he had some time earlier suggested an article on the subject, "purely historical" in its treatment, and calling his attention to the fact that various scientists were taking a more sympathetic attitude toward it. At all events he thought Curtis would wish to anticipate the publication of a work on the subject by persons who, he was sure, planned to use the facts "to undermine the *divine* character of the Gospel history, and the superhuman powers of its great Founder."²⁰ The

¹⁹ Lippincott's, *loc. cit.*

^{19a} Cf. Lane Cooper, *The Power of the Eye in Coleridge*, in *Studies . . . in Honor of J. M. Hart*, New York, 1910.

²⁰ Lippincott's, *op. cit.*

collection of Coleridge's manuscript fragments in the British Museum contains a fairly long note on animal magnetism signed by Coleridge and dated July 8, 1817.²¹ It consists of a carefully worded plea for open-mindedness in examining the facts, a statement of the magnetists' theoretical position, and a description of the "external manipulations" ordinarily involved; ending with an avowal of the writer's neutral position. While the note is not an article for an encyclopædia as it stands, it seems probable that Coleridge was ready to work it up into such an article, and that he hoped the *Metropolitana* would publish it. But again he hoped in vain.

Coleridge's share in the encyclopædia was, then, confined to the general plan and the closely related *Preliminary Treatise on Method*. And even these were altered. Exactly how much they were altered can never be known. If the essays on method that Coleridge subsequently published in *The Friend* represented the original version of the introduction, the problem would be simple. But they do not. The original version was undoubtedly destroyed. Coleridge said that the editors refused to return it to him and that he had destroyed his fragmentary first drafts^{21a}—and searches among the manuscript remains indicate that his statement was only too true. A few extant autograph scraps²² indicate that the original was written rather more in the style of an introduction than was *The Friend*. It is probable that in preparing his copy for *The Friend* Coleridge worked with the printed introduction before him, copying portions of it *verbatim*, and it is more than possible that he tried to reconstruct from memory some of the passages that had been deleted or garbled. But there would have

²¹ Add. MS. 36, 532.

^{21a} Cf. letters to Collier (see below p. xxiii and note); to Tulk (Griggs, *op. cit.*, II, 225-7); and to Cary (Griggs, II, 230-1).

²² See Appendix, pp. 80-88, especially 87.

been no point in trying to duplicate the original for publication in a totally different kind of work, and there is no reason to think that he made the attempt.

Even a partial solution of the problem of authenticity demands much more than comparison of the *Treatise* with *The Friend*. Comparison with other writings of Coleridge's will in some cases be quite as fruitful, and such comparison is sure to be made by individual readers, often without reference to the occasional suggestions offered in the notes of the present text. But a general statement of the "method" of the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* as it seems to have been conceived by Coleridge and the publishers—not always in agreement—may advantageously precede the more detailed study of Coleridge's treatise expounding that method. Such a statement is made possible by a consideration of the encyclopædia's table of contents^{22a} certain general ideas common to *The Friend* and the *Preliminary Treatise* (with some corroboration from manuscript fragments) and several important letters in which Coleridge told of his plan and of its alterations.

IV. THE METHOD OF THE "ENCYCLOPÆDIA"

The publishers of the *Metropolitana* and Coleridge apparently agreed that the work was to be "methodical," and was to be introduced by a treatise showing the importance of method and explaining the particular method exemplified in this encyclopædia.

The most general outlines of their idea are clearly implied by their discussion of other works of this nature. The original prospectus²³ showed them well aware of the difficulties of methodizing modern encyclopædias that must include so much more than the cycle of arts and sciences

^{22a} See Table, facing p. 71.

²³ See Appendix, pp. 71-79.

constituting the encyclopædias of the ancients. They explained that it was "the inapplicability of a strictly *scientific* method to a modern encyclopædia, such as shall include the whole of its contents," that had led to the "abandonment of all principle of rational arrangement." They were also aware of the need for combining the advantages of alphabetical arrangement with those of a "rational" order, and they knew of experiments that had been made along this line. Although they did not mention it by name, they were of course familiar with the first five editions of the *Britannica* that adhered to alphabetical arrangement but made a special point of organizing much of its material in the form of complete treatises.^{23a} They knew of the French attempt to methodize the *Encyclopédie* of Diderot and D'Alembert in the form of an *Encyclopédie Méthodique* then in process of publication. But they did not hesitate to denounce "all our universal dictionaries hitherto" for their "more or less complete disorganization of the Sciences and Systematic Arts; now retaining certain integral portions of the system as integers, forming each an entire treatise, but resigning these treatises to the places severally assigned them by the accident of their initial letters; and now splintering all alike into their practical parts, with an arrangement merely alphabetical." One of the serious drawbacks of alphabetical arrangement noted in the prospectus was the necessity of often referring the reader from an earlier volume to a later instead of the reverse. The prospectus also criticized other encyclopædias for want of proportion and for including speculative opinions instead of confining themselves to established truths—probably one of Coleridge's characteristic thrusts at the French. Works that committed this latter sin evinced no clear idea

^{23a} Comparison of the first and fifth editions of the *Britannica* shows the experimenting in method that was being done.

of the nature of an encyclopædia, properly "a *History* of human knowledge, in which, therefore, these intellectual embryos, which are at best (as it were) but truths in the *future* tense, have no rightful or befitting place."

The *Metropolitana* proposed to avoid these difficulties by planning the general proportions of the work in advance—the preliminary announcement gave the number of volumes of each of the main divisions; by openly declaring any "opinions or speculations" to be such, and presenting these "merely as an appendix to the article to which they belong" if at all; and by arranging its material in a way that ensured the advantages of both alphabetical and rational order. There were to be four main divisions, though Coleridge had once planned for eight. First were to come the Pure Sciences, and then, in the second division, the Mixed and Applied Sciences. Since this second division would grow out of the first, the necessary references would almost always be retrospective. The third, or biographical division (including also historical and geographical material) would naturally follow the first two as it would "teach the same truths by example" that had been "evolved" in the former divisions, "and stimulate to the exertions that have developed them." The fourth, miscellaneous and lexicographical division, together with the index, would enable readers to find "every word in its usual alphabetical place . . . with a plain reference to the volume and page containing its full explanation in the present work." It would also contain illustrative and miscellaneous articles.

With such a scheme of progressive development in mind it is no wonder that Coleridge was bitterly disappointed when the publishers decided to issue a portion of each of the four divisions, even the miscellaneous and lexicographical, in every "part" beginning with the very first. He must have known of this in advance of the actual

publication, for in August 1817 he had engaged to produce several sheets of copy for the *Lexicon* by October 1; but it rendered almost impossible the evolutionary progression that he had planned. It was not strange that after looking over the first part he pronounced it "an infamous catch-penny, or rather catch-guinea."^{23b}

But it was in the arrangement of the material of the first two divisions, the arts and sciences, that Coleridge's chief philosophic interest lay, and perhaps his bitterest disappointment. There is considerable evidence as to his scheme for these sections, and the failure of his publishers to do it justice.

The scheme showed courage. A few years later, in 1826, Dugald Stewart was to give up an attempt to construct a "map" of the various arts and sciences and their inter-relations for a supplement to the *Britannica*.²⁴ He had expected to follow more or less closely D'Alembert's modification of Bacon's table, but when he became convinced that his predecessors' views were essentially erroneous he refrained from substituting a map of his own and expressed his doubt as to whether the time had come for "hazarding, with any reasonable prospect of success," a repetition of the "bold experiment."

But Coleridge, full of enthusiasm for the principle of "trichotomy" and eager to reconcile the philosophies of Plato and Bacon by its means, was undaunted. He proposed a scheme that was trichotomous not only in its main divisions but in its subdivisions as well, and however seriously one may respect the truths he was trying to express it is impossible not to smile at the ingenuity of his detailed applications. When Mr. Curtis found himself perplexed about the logical position of agriculture, horticulture, and

^{23b} Letter to Tulk, January 26, 1818; *loc. cit.*

²⁴ Supplement to the 4th, 5th, and 6th editions, Preface to the *First Dissertation*.

law, Coleridge replied, in a letter that should be read *in toto*,²⁵ assuring him that their places were easily assigned, and had always been present in his mind "from the very nature of the *Unitrine* division" he had adopted. This, he said, was the only division "at once perspicuous and philosophical." "For in *all* things," he argued, "we *all* of us arrange in the same way—A, and the opposite of A (Say, B) and that in which A and B co-exist." Then he proved conclusively, to his own satisfaction at least, that agriculture must follow political economy and precede the manufactures and hand-crafts, even as house or pale painting and "such verses as *Thirty Days hath September, April, June and November*" must follow poetry, music, and historic painting, and precede architecture and horticulture.

To consider the scheme more seriously it is best to turn to the main divisions. *The Friend*, the theoretical section of the *Preliminary Treatise*, and the letter to Tulk of January 26, 1818, all show that Coleridge meant to group the arts and sciences in three main classes—the Pure Sciences, "in which both the matter and form are wholly in and for the mind"; their opposites, the Applied Sciences or scientific arts; and finally the Fine Arts, forming an "intermediate link" between the two.²⁶ Coleridge was, of course, insisting that his "opposites" were to be distinguished but not separated, for there was an ideal element—a mental initiative—in the most empirical and utilitarian arts and sciences if these were properly conceived and practised. Naturally he wanted to suggest this graphically by a trichotomous table of contents. Perhaps if the originally planned eight divisions had not been reduced to four, with his grudging consent, the publishers could

²⁵ Letter of August, 1817; *Unpublished Letters* (Griggs), II, 203 ff.

²⁶ Cf. MS fragment, p. 85.

have managed it. But as it was they made the Fine Arts a subdivision of the Applied Sciences and Arts, to Coleridge's very real grief.

A little sympathy is due the publishers, however. To arrange a table of contents so that both main and subordinate divisions shall be trichotomous is difficult enough at best ; but Coleridge's schematizing genius saw so many different ways of applying the principle that it is a question whether even he himself ever worked out a completely consistent table in all its details. He may have, but at times he seemed to hint that the Mixed Sciences were to occupy the mediating position between the Pure and Applied Sciences,²⁷ thus threatening a clash with the Fine Arts that must have perturbed Mr. Curtis and the Et ceteri Club.

Some of Coleridge's hopes for the table of contents were fulfilled. The "unitrine" principle stood out clearly in the arrangement of the Real Sciences and could be traced in some other groups. Moreover, the Applied Sciences quite properly followed the Pure, indicating the inferiority of the senses and understanding to the reason, and of "theory" to "law," as well as the logical dependence of the lower on the higher.

The influence of Plato and the Neo-Platonists and of Kant and his German successors is very obvious in this scheme. But as usual Coleridge had made his own combinations and modifications.²⁸ It is very probable that he was influenced to some extent by previous applications of Kantian thought to encyclopædic method.²⁹ In 1803

²⁷ Cf. references to the Mixed Sciences in the *Treatise* and to Astronomy in *The Friend*. See also important letter to J. B. Williams, December 12, 1817; *Unpublished Letters* (Griggs), II, 210-12.

²⁸ On Coleridge, Kant, and the principle of trichotomy, see J. H. Muirhead, *Coleridge as Philosopher*, London and New York, 1930, pp. 82 ff. Cf. also E. Winkelmänn's *Coleridge und die Kantische Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1933.

²⁹ On the application of Kantian principles to encyclopædic method see article on encyclopædias in Meyers *Conversations-Lexicon*, 5th edition, V, 754 ff.

Schelling had noted that his *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums* might easily develop into a general encyclopædia of the sciences. Moreover, Carl C. E. Schmid's outline of encyclopædic science and methodology, published in 1810,³⁰ made considerable use of the principle of trichotomy, and there are some close correspondences between his table and Coleridge's—together with many marked differences.

V. THE PRELIMINARY TREATISE ITSELF

The changes made by the editors in this introductory exposition and application of principles aroused Coleridge to even greater wrath than their revision of the general scheme, if it is fair to judge by his outburst to Collier so often quoted in part. Coleridge had granted the right of omission, and even wrote J. H. Green on December 13, 1817, that he was not "inclined to quarrel with the judgment and prudence of omission, as far as the public is concerned."³¹ It is safe to assume that the more metaphysical portions, that Coleridge wished Green might have read as they stood, were deleted or condensed in many instances. However, the editors did not confine themselves to this; they also rearranged, interpolated, and "bedeviled," as Coleridge complained to Collier.³²

The published *Treatise* did nevertheless express much of

³⁰ *Allgemeine Encyklopädie und Methodologie der Wissenschaften*.

³¹ December 13, 1817; *Letters* (E. H. Coleridge), II, 680.

³² Cf. Raysor, *op. cit.*, II, 342 note for reference etc. Since the authenticity of passages common to the *Treatise* and *The Friend* may be taken for granted, such passages have been indicated in the notes of the present text. In these cases there has seemed to be no need of going further and pointing out obvious parallels between ideas common to both versions and those expressed by Coleridge in other works, notably the *Aids to Reflection*, *Biographia Literaria*, *Statesman's Manual*, *Theory of Life*, and miscellaneous criticisms of poetry, drama, and art. Where the *Treatise* varies markedly from *The Friend*, however, evidence of authenticity is sometimes offered by reference to other works and to letters.

Coleridge's best thinking, and in a form so different from the more metaphysical and theological essays in *The Friend* that it must have appealed to a slightly different class of readers. There have been six separate editions of the *Treatise*³³ and several issued in combination with one or more other sections of the *Metropolitana*, forming, for example, an *Encyclopædia of Mental Philosophy* or a *Student's Encyclopædia*. The fifth edition, of 1852, was entitled *A Dissertation on the Science of Method*, or the *Laws and Regulative Principles of Education*. Logical and educational interests were appealed to. A straw that shows the direction of the wind in the middle of the century is the use made of the *Treatise* by Samuel Neil in his *Art of Reasoning*, published serially in the *British Controversialist*, 1850-1852, and subsequently in book form: toward the end of the series Neil asked leave to revise the definition of *method* that he had offered in his introductory paper, since extensive study in philosophy had changed his opinions, and he established his new position by quotations from Coleridge's *Treatise on Method*. His quotations and comments here and in the chapter on *Ratiocination* show that from this version of the *Method* he gained a real understanding of some of Coleridge's ideas.

Many of the differences between the *Treatise* and the essays in *The Friend* lie in details that can be indicated by footnotes but not adequately summarized. But a general statement of differences in emphasis and organization of material is possible, and may well bring this introduction to a close.

VI. THE TREATISE AND THE FRIEND

The general differences in arrangement and emphasis between the *Preliminary Treatise on Method* and the

³³ Cf. Wise's *Bibliography*, p. 115.

essays on method in *The Friend* are such as would naturally follow from the purposes for which the two versions were composed—and, in the case of the *Treatise*—revised by the editors.

The occasion of the *Preliminary Treatise* was the need to argue for method in arranging the subject-matter of an encyclopædia, and to explain the particular method used in the *Metropolitana*. This occasion permitted a fundamental discussion of the nature and importance of method in general and an exposition of Coleridge's own science of method that involved his whole philosophical creed. But it necessitated the focussing of this discussion on the particular problem the editors were trying to solve; hence the relatively elaborate application of principles to the classification of the arts and sciences.

The Friend, however, had no reason for considering encyclopædic method, nor for surveying the various branches of learning that an encyclopædia would naturally include, except in as far as some consideration of various arts and sciences was essential to the avowed purpose of the book. It will be recalled that *The Friend*, as reconstructed and enlarged for the 1818 edition, consisted of a general introduction and two main sections, in addition to the *Landing Places* interspersed for relaxation and literary amusement. Section 1 dealt with the principles of political knowledge; Section 2 with "the grounds of morals and religion, and the discipline of the mind requisite for a true understanding of the same." The essays on method constituted the main part (Essays IV–XI) of Section 2. They were introduced (in Essay III) as "preparatory steps" for future investigations which involved a "previous agreement as to the principles of reasoning in general." They were presented as "the basis" of Coleridge's "future philosophical and theological writings, and as the neces-

sary introduction to the same." The material of the essays was therefore shaped so as to emphasize the most fundamental principle at which the discussion arrived, the grounding of all reason in the moral and religious nature of man, the grounding of science in theology. The emphasis placed on this principle (stated definitely but more briefly in the *Treatise*) accounted for the inclusion of the fuller discussion of Platonism in Essay V and a large part of the concluding essay of the series.

The arrangement in *The Friend* of material common to both works is naturally so different from that in the *Preliminary Treatise* that any scheme of collating by parallel columns becomes too complex to present a clear or significant picture, though the references given in the footnotes of the present text will enable anyone interested to work out such a scheme. A sample of the extent to which the re-arrangement was carried is obtained by taking the material of the first essay on method in *The Friend* and locating its larger divisions in the *Treatise*, as follows :—

Sec. II, Essay IV of *The Friend*
(first essay on method).

Preliminary Treatise.

1. The importance of method
in ordinary life.

This does not appear until the opening of the second of the three main sections.

2. Illustrations of this importance drawn from Shakspearean characters.

References to Shakspearean characters do not occur until the middle of the second section, and there they are closely related to a full discussion of Shakspeare's method of composition.

3. *Brief* statement of Shakspeare's own method of composition.

4. Definition of *method*.

The definition is given practically at the beginning of the first section.

But such an analysis as this fails to indicate the different

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ways in which certain details of material were organised in the two versions. As stated before, recourse must be had to the footnotes, and not infrequently to the two texts themselves, the comparable sections of which are pointed out in the notes even when the differences do not lend themselves to concise statement.

NOTE ON EDITIONS AND TEXTS

Preliminary Treatise on Method. The text followed is that of the cabinet edition of the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*, 1849, etc. This text differs from that of the quarto edition of 1818 in typographical details (capitalization, and less frequently minor matters of punctuation). Since Coleridge himself had no part in revising and editing his own MS for the original edition of 1818, it has seemed wise to follow the later text, in which the use of capitals corresponds in general to Coleridge's *manuscript* practice, and serves to clarify the argument by distribution of emphasis. The gloss is omitted. Every instance in which the phraseology differs from that of the original edition of 1818, no matter how slightly, is indicated in the notes.

The Friend. References in the notes make possible the detailed collation of the *Treatise* with any of several standard editions of *The Friend*. The *first reference* is always to the Pickering editions of 1837 and 1843, edited and revised by H. N. Coleridge in accordance with S. T. Coleridge's final corrections. This reference also serves for Harper's edition, (*Complete Works*, ed. W. G. T. Shedd, New York, 1884). Since the division into essays and the paragraphing of the 1818 edition (Fenner, London) is not identical with that followed by H. N. Coleridge, a *second reference* has been given wherever necessary, "1818." Bohn's Standard Library editions (London 1867 etc.) follow the Pickering edition in some respects but not in all; where they differ from the Pickering edition a *third reference* is given, "Bohn."

Editions of other works by Coleridge referred to in Introduction and Notes:

Aids to Reflection. London, 1825.

Biographia Epistolaris, ed. Turnbull. 2 vol. London, 1911.

Biographia Literaria, ed. Shawcross. 2 vol., Oxford, 1907.

Coleridge on Logic and Learning with Selections from the Unpublished Manuscripts, ed. Snyder. New Haven and London, 1929.

Coleridge's Shakespearean Criticism, ed. Raysor. 2 vol., London, 1930.

Letters of S. T. Coleridge, ed. E. H. Coleridge. 2 vol., London, 1895.

Miscellanies, Æsthetic and Literary, ed. Ashe. London, 1885.

Some Unpublished Letters of S. T. Coleridge, ed. Towle. *Lippincott's Magazine*, June, 1874.

The Statesman's Manual. London, 1816.

Unpublished Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Griggs. 2 vol., London, 1932.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA

OR

A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON METHOD

SECTION I

ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES OF METHOD

1 ¹ THE word ENCYCLOPÆDIA is too familiar to Modern Literature to require, in this place, any detailed explanation. It is current amongst us as the title of various Dictionaries of Science, whose professed object is to furnish a compendium of Human Knowledge, whatever may be their plan. But to *methodize* such a compendium has either never been attempted, or the attempt has failed, from the total disregard of those general connecting principles, on which Method essentially depends. In presenting, therefore, to the Public an entirely new Work, intended to be Methodically arranged, we are not insensible to the difficulties of our undertaking; but we trust that we have found a clue to the labyrinth in those considerations which we are now about to submit to the reader.

2 AS METHOD is thus avowed to be the principal aim and distinguishing feature of our publication, it becomes us at the commencement, clearly to explain in this Introduction what we mean ² by that word; to exhibit the Principles on which alone a correct Philosophical Method can be founded; to illustrate those principles by their application to dis-

¹ ¶¶ 1 and 2 are not included in *The Friend*; but for a similar criticism of other encyclopædias see Coleridge's letter to Southey, July, 1803, *Letters* (E. H. Coleridge), I, 425-7.

² In the first edition "in this introduction" follows "we mean."

tinct studies and to the History of the Human Mind ; and lastly to apply them to the general concatenation of the several Arts and Sciences, and to the most perspicuous, elegant, and useful manner of developing each particular study. Such are the objects of this Essay, which we conceive must form a necessary Introduction to a Work, that is designated in its title from the place whence it originates, —ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA ; but claims from its mode of execution to be also called “ *a METHODICAL Compendium of Human Knowledge.*”

3³ The word METHOD (*μέθοδος*) being of Grecian origin, first formed and applied by that acute, ingenious, and accurate People, to the purposes of Scientific arrangement, it is in the Greek Language that we must seek for its primary and fundamental signification. Now, in Greek, it literally means *a way, or path, of transit*. Hence the first idea of Method is *a progressive transition* from one step in any course to another ; and where the word Method is applied with reference to many such transitions in continuity, it necessarily implies a Principle of UNITY WITH PROGRESSION. But that which unites, and makes many things *one* in the Mind of Man, must be an act of the Mind itself, a manifestation of intellect, and not a spontaneous and uncertain production of circumstances. This act of the Mind, then, this leading thought, this “key note” of the harmony, this “subtile, cementing, subterraneous” power, borrowing a phrase from the nomenclature of legislation, we may not inaptly call the INITIATIVE of all Method. It is manifest, that the wider the sphere of transition is, the more comprehensive and commanding must be the initiative : and if we would discover an *universal Method*, by which every step in our progress through the

³ ¶¶ 3 and 4. Cf. *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay IV, ¶ 16, where the substance of this definition of method is given, more briefly, following a statement about Shakspeare’s method.

whole circle of Art and Science should be directed, it is absolutely necessary that we should seek it in the very interior and central essence of the Human intellect.

4 To this point we are led by mere reflection on the meaning of the word Method. We discover that it cannot, otherwise than by abuse, be applied to a dead and arbitrary arrangement, containing in itself no Principle of progression. We discover, that there is a *Science of Method*; and that *that* Science, like all others, must necessarily have its *Principles*; which it therefore becomes our duty to consider, in so far at least as they may be necessary to the arrangement of a Methodical Encyclopædia.

5⁴ All things, in us, and about us, are a Chaos, without Method: and so long as the mind is entirely passive, so long as there is an habitual submission of the Understanding to mere events and images, as such, without any attempt to classify and arrange them, so long the Chaos must continue. There may be transition, but there can never be progress; there may be sensation, but there cannot be thought; for the total absence of Method renders thinking impracticable; as we find that partial defects of Method proportionably render thinking a trouble and a fatigue. But as soon as the mind becomes accustomed to contemplate, not *things* only, but likewise *relations* of things, there is immediate need of some path or way of transit from one to the other of the things related;—there must be some law of agreement or of contrast between them; there must be some mode of comparison; in short, there must be Method. We may, therefore, assert that the *relations of things* form the prime objects, or, so to speak, the *materials of Method*; and that the contemplation of those relations is the indispensable condition of thinking Methodically.

⁴ The substance of ¶ 5 is given in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay IV, ¶ 6, and Essay V, ¶ 1.

6⁵ Of these relations of things, we distinguish two principal kinds. One of them is the relation by which we understand that a thing *must be* : the other, that by which we merely perceive that it *is*. The one, we call the relation of LAW, using that word in its highest and original sense, namely, that of *laying down* a rule to which the subjects of the LAW must necessarily conform. The other, we call the relation of THEORY.

7 The relation of LAW is in its absolute perfection conceivable only of GOD, that Supreme Light, and Living Law, "in whom we live and move, and have our being ;" who is ἐν παντί, and πρὸ τῶν πάντων. But yet the Human Mind is capable of viewing some relations of things as necessarily existent ; that is to say, as predetermined by a truth in the Mind itself, pregnant with the consequence of other truths in an indefinite progression. Of such truths, some continue always to exist in and for the Mind alone, forming the *Pure Sciences*, moral or intellectual ; whilst others, though originating in the Mind, constitute what are commonly called the great Laws of Nature, and form the groundwork of the *Mixed Sciences*, such as those of Mechanics and Astronomy.

8⁶ The second relation is that of THEORY, in which the existing forms and qualities of objects, discovered by observation, suggest a given arrangement of them to the Mind, not merely for the purposes of more easy remembrance and communication ; but for those of understanding, and sometimes of controlling them. The studies to

⁵ ¶¶ 6 and 7. On the following classification of the sciences, see above, pp. xix-xxiii.

The exposition of the "relation of Law" in *The Friend* is essentially the same, Sec. II, Essay V, ¶ 1. The phrases "Pure Sciences" and "Mixed Sciences" are not used, but specific illustrations are given. This exposition is followed by a discussion of Plato's philosophy omitted here.

⁶ ¶ 8. In *The Friend* the definition of the "relation of Theory" is postponed to Sec. II, Essay VI, ¶ 1 (1818, Essay V, ¶ 5). Though many of the phrases are identical, the emphasis is different.

which this class of relations is subservient, are more properly called *Scientific Arts* ⁷ than Sciences. Medicine, Chemistry, and Physiology are examples of a Method founded ⁸ on this second sort of relation, which, as well as the former, ⁹ always supposes the necessary connection of cause and effect.

⁹ ¹⁰ The relations of Law and Theory have each their Methods. Between these two, lies the Method of the FINE ARTS, a Method in which certain great truths, composing what are usually called the *Laws of Taste*, necessarily predominate; but in which there are also other Laws, dependent on the external objects of sight and sound, which these Arts embrace. To prove the comparative value and dignity of the first relation, it will be sufficient to observe that what is called "tinkling" verse is disagreeable to the accomplished Critic in Poetry, and that a fine Musical taste is soon dissatisfied with the Harmonica, or any similar instrument of glass or steel, because the *body* of the sound (as the Italians phrase it), or that effect which is derived from the materials, encroaches too far on the effect derived from the proportions of the notes, which proportions are, in fact, Laws of the Mind, analogous to the Laws of Arithmetic and Geometry.

¹⁰ ¹¹ We have stated, that Method implies both an *uniting* and a *progressive* power. Now the relations of

⁷ This term is used in *The Friend* without reference to the alternative.

⁸ *The Friend*—inserts "hitherto" between "Method" and "founded," apparently witnessing Coleridge's hope that these sciences were soon to be based on more fundamental laws (Cf. his *Theory of Life*)

⁹ The words "as well as the former" are omitted in *The Friend*, and "general idea" is substituted for "necessary connection." It is difficult to determine whether Coleridge meant to use the phrase "cause and effect" in a physical, mechanistic sense, to establish the inferiority of theory to law, or to use it in its metaphysical sense (see Letter to Williams, *Unpublished Letters*, II, 203 ff.) and thus emphasize the element that theory and law have in common.

¹⁰ ¶ 9. Cf. *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay VI, ¶ 2 (1818, Essay V, ¶ 6). The development of the idea differs considerably in the two versions. Cf. also the autograph fragment, p. 85 below.

¹¹ ¶ 10. This paragraph does not occur in *The Friend*, but there is no reason for questioning its authorship. On the correlative relationship of *Idea* and *Law* see Pickering editions, note dated "1829" to Sec. II, Essay V, ¶ 1.

things are not united in Human conception at random—*humano capiti—cervicem equinam*; but there is some rule, some mode of union, more or less, strictly necessary. Where it is absolutely necessary, we have called it a relation of Law; and as by Law we mean the laying down the rule, so the rule laid down we call, in the ancient and proper sense of the word, an *Idea*; and consequently the words Idea and Law are correlative terms, differing only as object and subject, as Being and Truth. It is extremely necessary to advert to this use of the word Idea; since, in Modern Philosophy, almost any and every exercise of any and every mental faculty has been abusively called by this name, to the utter confusion and *unmethodizing* of the whole Science of the Human Mind, and indeed of all other Knowledge whatsoever.

11¹² The Idea may exist in a clear, distinct, definite form, as that of a circle in the Mind of an accurate Geometrician; or it may be a mere *instinct*, a vague appetency towards something which the Mind incessantly hunts for, but cannot find, like a name which has escaped our recollection, or the impulse which fills the young Poet's eye with tears, he knows not why. In the infancy of the Human Mind all our ideas are instincts; and Language is happily contrived to lead us from the vague to the distinct, from the imperfect to the full and finished form: the boy knows that his hoop is round, and this, in after years, helps to teach him, that in a circle, all the lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are equal. It will be seen, in the sequel, that this distinction between the instinctive approach towards an Idea, and the Idea itself, is of high importance in Methodizing Art and Science.

¹² ¶ 11, with its interesting distinction between the "instinctive approach toward an Idea" and "the Idea itself," does not appear in *The Friend*. It is, however, in harmony with other utterances of Coleridge's on mental processes and on language, and the distinction is referred to in different terms in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay VI, ¶ 2, the final sentence (1818, Essay V, ¶ 6).

12¹³ From the first, or initiative Idea, as from a seed, successive Ideas germinate. Thus, from the Idea of a triangle, necessarily follows that of equality between the sum of its three angles and two right angles. This is the *Principle* of an indefinite, not to say infinite, *Progression*; but this progression, which is truly Method, requires not only the proper choice of an initiative, but also the following it out through all its ramifications. It requires, in short, a constant wakefulness of Mind; so that if we wander but in a single instance from our path, we cannot reach the goal, but by retracing our steps to the point of divergency, and thence beginning our progress anew. Thus, a ship beating off and on an unknown coast, often takes, in nautical phrase, "a new departure;" and thus it is necessary often to recur to that regulating process, which the French Language so happily expresses by the word *s'orienter*, *i. e.* to find out the East for ourselves, and so to put to rights our faulty reckoning.

13¹⁴ The habit of Method should always be present and effective; but in order to render it so, a certain training, or education of the Mind, is indispensably necessary. Events and images, the lively and spirit-stirring machinery of the external world, are like light, and air, and moisture, to the seed of the Mind, which would else rot and perish. In all processes of mental evolution the objects of the senses must stimulate the Mind; and the Mind must in turn assimilate and digest the food which it thus receives from without. Method, therefore, must result from the due mean, or balance, between our passive impressions and the Mind's reaction on them. So in the healthful state of the

¹³ ¶ 12 does not occur in *The Friend*, though the phrase *s'orienter* is used there in another connection.

¹⁴ ¶ 13. The nearest parallel in *The Friend* (and it is not close) is in Sec. II, Essay IV, ¶¶ 5 ff. The genuineness of the ideas is unquestionable, however. Cf. Coleridge's analysis of Hamlet's character *Shakespearean Criticism* (Raysor) I, 37.

Human body, waking and sleeping, rest and labour, reciprocally succeed each other, and mutually contribute to liveliness, and activity, and strength. There are certain stores proper, and, as it were, indigenous to the Mind, such as the Ideas of number and figure, and the logical forms and combinations of conception or thought. The Mind that is rich and exuberant in this intellectual wealth, is apt, like a miser, to dwell upon the vain contemplation of its riches, is disposed to generalize and *methodize* to excess, ever philosophizing, and never descending to action ;—spreading its wings high in the air above some beloved spot, but never flying far and wide over earth and sea, to seek food, or to enjoy the endless beauties of Nature ; the fresh morning and the warm noon, and the dewy eve. On the other hand, still less is to be expected, toward the Methodizing of Science, from the man who flutters about in blindness, like the bat ; or is carried hither and thither, like the turtle sleeping on the wave, and fancying, because he moves, that he is in progress.

14¹⁵ The paths in which we may pursue a Methodical course are manifold : at the head of each stands its peculiar and guiding Idea ; and those Ideas are as regularly subordinate in dignity, as the paths to which they point are various and eccentric in direction. The world has suffered much, in modern times, from a subversion of the natural and necessary order of Science : from elevating the terrestrial, as it has been called, above the celestial ; and from summoning Reason and Faith to the bar of that limited Physical experience, to which, by the true laws of Method, they owe no obedience. The subordination, of which we here speak, is not that which depends on immediate prac-

¹⁵ ¶¶ 14-17. *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay XI (1818, Essay X misprinted "IX") argues for the same subordination of the physical to the metaphysical at much greater length and in very different terms. The editors were probably responsible for this condensation, not altogether successful.

tical utility : for the utility of Human powers, in their practical application, depends on the circumstances of the moment ; and at one time strength is essential to our very existence, at another time skill : and even Cæsar in a fever could cry,

Give me some drink, Titinius,
As a sick girl.

In truth there is scarcely any one of the powers or faculties with which the Divine Goodness has endowed his creatures, which may not in its turn be a source of paramount benefit and usefulness ; for every thing around us is full of blessings : nor is there any line of honest occupation in which we would dare to affirm, that by a proper exercise of the talent committed to his charge, an individual might not justly advance himself to highest praise. But we now allude to the subordination which necessarily arises among the different branches of Knowledge, according to the difference of those Ideas by which they are initiated and directed ; for there is a gradation of Ideas, as of ranks in a well-ordered State, or of commands in a well-regulated army ; and thus above all partial forms, there is one universal form of GOOD and FAIR, the *καλοκάγαθον* of the Platonic Philosophy. Hence the expressions of Lord Bacon, who in his great Work, the *Novum Organum*, speaks so much and so often of the *lumen siccum*, the pure light, which from a central focus, as it were, diffuses its rays all around, and forms a lucid sphere of Knowledge and of Truth.

15¹⁶ We distinguish Ideas into those of essential property, and those of natural existence ; in other words, into Metaphysical and Physical Ideas. Metaphysical Ideas, or those which relate to the essence of things as possible, are

¹⁶ ¶ 15. For the development of this idea see Letter to Williams, *Unpublished Letters* (Griggs), II, 210 ff. Cf. note to *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay VI, ¶ 3 (1818 Essay V, ¶ 8 ; Bohn, VI, ¶ 4).

of the highest class. Thus, in accurate language, we say, the *essence* of a circle, not its nature ; because, in the conception of forms purely Geometrical, there is no expression or implication of their actual existence : and our reasoning upon them is totally independent of the fact, whether any such forms ever existed in Nature, or not. Physical Ideas are those which we mean to express, when we speak of the *nature* of a thing actually existing and cognizable by our faculties, whether the thing be material or immaterial, bodily or mental. Thus, the laws of memory, the laws of vision, the laws of vegetation, the laws of crystallisation, are all Physical Ideas, dependent for their accuracy, on the more or less careful observation of things actually existing.

16 ¹⁷ In speaking of the word Nature, however, we must distinguish its two principal uses, *viz.* first, that to which we have adverted, and according to which it signifies whatever is requisite to the reality of a thing as existent, such as the nature of an animal or a tree, distinguished from the animal or tree itself : and secondly, the sum total of things, as far as they are objects of our senses. In the first of these two meanings, the word Nature conveys a Physical *Idea*, in the other only a material or sensible *Impression*.

17 Even natural substances, it is true, may be classed and arranged for various purposes, in a certain order. Such *mere* arrangement, however, is not properly Methodical, but rather a preparation toward Method ; as the compilation of a Dictionary is a preparation for classical study.

18 ¹⁸ The limits of our present Essay will not allow us to do more than briefly to touch the chief topics of a general

¹⁷ ¶ 16. The distinction between the different meanings of the word "Nature" is made in *The Friend* in a note to Sec. II, Essay VI, ¶ 3 (1818, Essay V, ¶ 8; Bohn, VI, ¶ 4).

¹⁸ This summary does not appear in *The Friend*.

dissertation on Method; but enough we trust has here been said, to render intelligible the principles on which our Methodical Encyclopædia must be constructed. We have shown that a Method, which is at all comprehensive, must be founded on the *relations of things*: that those relations are of two sorts, according as they present themselves to the Human Mind as *necessary*, or merely as the result of *observation*. The former we have called relations of Law, the latter of Theory. Where the former alone are in question, the Method is one of necessary connection throughout; where the latter alone, though the connection be considered as one of cause and effect, yet the necessity is less obvious, and the connection itself less close. We have observed, that in the Fine Arts there is a sort of middle Method, inasmuch as the first and higher relations are necessary, the lower are only the results of observation. The great principles of all Method we have shown to be two, *viz. Union and Progression*. The relations of things cannot be united by accident: they are united by an *Idea* either definite or instinctive. Their union, in proportion as it is clear, is also progressive. The state of Mind adapted to such progress holds a due mean between a passiveness under external impression, and an excessive activity of mere reflection; and the progress itself follows the path of the Idea from which it sets out; requiring, however, a constant wakefulness of Mind, to keep it within the due limits of its course. Hence the orbits of Thought, so to speak, must differ among themselves as the initiative Ideas differ; and of these latter, the great distinctions are into *Physical* and *Metaphysical*. Such, briefly, are the views by which we have been guided, in our present attempt to Methodize the great mass of Human Knowledge.

SECTION II

ILLUSTRATION OF THE PRECEDING PRINCIPLES

1¹ THE Principles which have been exhibited in the preceding Section, and in respect to which we claim no other merit, than that of having drawn them from the purest sources of Philosophy, ancient and modern, are, we trust, sufficiently plain and intelligible in themselves ; but as the most satisfactory mode of proving their accuracy, we proceed to illustrate them by a consideration of some particular studies, pursuits, and opinions ; and by a reference to the general History of the Human Mind.

2² And first, as to the general importance of Method ;— what need have we to dilate on this fertile topic ? For it is not solely in the formation of the Human Understanding, and in the constructions of Science and Literature, that the employment of Method is indispensably necessary ; but its importance is equally felt, and equally acknowledged, in the whole business and economy of active and domestic life. From the cottager's hearth or the workshop of the artisan, to the Palace or the Arsenal, the first merit, that which admits neither substitute nor equivalent, is, that *every thing is in its place*. Where this charm is wanting, every other merit either loses its name, or becomes an additional ground of accusation and regret. Of one, by whom it is eminently possessed, we say proverbially, that he is like clockwork. The resemblance extends beyond the point of regularity, and yet falls short of the truth. Both do, indeed, at once

¹ This introductory paragraph does not appear in *The Friend*.

² ¶ 2, beginning with the third sentence, is included practically *verbatim* in *The Friend* very near the beginning of the essays on method, Sec. II, Essay IV, ¶ 3.

divide and announce the silent and otherwise indistinguishable lapse of time ; but the man of Methodical industry and honourable pursuits, does more ; he realizes its ideal divisions, and gives a character and individuality to its moments. If the idle are described as killing time, he may be justly said to call it into life and moral being, while he makes it the distinct object not only of the consciousness, but of the conscience. He organizes the hours, and gives them a soul : and to that, the very essence of which is to fleet, and *to have been*, he communicates an imperishable and a spiritual nature. Of the good and faithful servant, whose energies, thus directed, are thus methodized, it is less truly affirmed, that he lives in Time, than that Time lives in him. His days, months, and years, as the stops and punctual marks in the records of duties performed, will survive the wreck of worlds, and remain extant when Time itself shall be no more.

3³ Let us carry our views a step higher. What is it that first strikes us, and strikes us at once in a man of education, and which, among educated men, so instantly distinguishes the man of superior Mind ? Not always the weight or novelty of his remarks, nor always the interest of the facts which he communicates ; for the subject of conversation may chance to be trivial, and its duration to be short. Still less can any just admiration arise from any peculiarity in his words and phrases ; for every man of practical good sense will follow, as far as the matters under consideration will permit him, that golden rule of Cæsar—*Insolens verbum, tanquam scopulum, evitare*.⁴ The true cause of the impression made on us is, that his mind is *methodical*. We per-

³ ¶ 3. *The Friend* omits the introductory (purely transitional) sentence, but uses the remainder, practically *verbatim*, to open the essays on method, Sec. II, Essay IV, ¶ 1. *The Friend* amplifies the "golden rule" somewhat, and characteristically adds the qualification "unless new things necessitate new terms."

⁴ Adapted from Julius Cæsar, *De Analogia*.

ceive this in the unpremeditated and evidently habitual arrangement of his words, flowing spontaneously and necessarily from the clearness of the leading Idea ; from which distinctness of mental vision, when men are fully accustomed to it, they obtain a habit of foreseeing at the beginning of every instance how it is to end, and how all its parts may be brought out in the best and most orderly succession. However irregular and desultory the conversation may happen to be, there is *Method* in the fragments.

4⁵ Let us once more take an example which must come "home to every man's business and bosom." Is there not a *Method* in the discharge of all our relative duties ? And is not he the truly virtuous and truly happy man, who seizing first and laying hold most firmly of the great first Truth, is guided by that divine light through all the meandering and stormy courses of his existence ? To him every relation of life affords a prolific *Idea* of duty ; by pursuing which into all its practical consequences, he becomes a good servant or a good master, a good subject or a good sovereign, a good son or a good father ; a good friend, a good patriot, a good Christian, a good man !

5⁶ It cannot be deemed foreign from the purposes of our Disquisition, if we are anxious, before we leave this part of the subject, to attract the attention of our readers to the importance of speculative meditation (which never will be fruitful unless it be methodical) even to the *worldly* interests of mankind. We can recall no incident of human

⁵ ¶ 4 does not appear in *The Friend*.

⁶ ¶ 5. A somewhat similar passage, with the quotation from Chiabrera, occurs in *The Friend* as a footnote to ¶ 6 of Sec. II, Essay VII ; 1818, Essay VI. But there it is incidental to a comparison of "the stationary condition of magnetism" and the "rapid progress of electricity," designed to show the *absence* of method in the study of the former (see below, pp. 18-20). *The Friend* does not state that Columbus saw "distinctly" the leading idea, though it credits him with a considerable amount of method.

history that impresses the imagination more deeply than the moment, when Columbus, on an unknown ocean, first perceived that startling fact, the change of the magnetic needle ! How many such instances occur in History, where the *Ideas* of Nature (presented to chosen minds by a Higher Power than Nature herself) suddenly unfold, as it were, in prophetic succession, systematic views destined to produce the most important revolutions in the state of Man ! The clear spirit of Columbus was doubtless eminently *methodical*. He saw distinctly that great leading Idea, which authorized the poor pilot to become “a promiser of kingdoms :” and he pursued the progressive development of the mighty truth with an unyielding firmness, which taught him to “rejoice in lofty labours.” Our readers will perhaps excuse us for quoting, as illustrative of what we have here observed, some lines from an Ode of Chiabrera’s, which, in strength of thought and lofty majesty of Poetry, has but “few peers in ancient or in modern Song.”

COLUMBUS.

Certo da cor, ch’ alto destin non scelse,
 Son l’imprese magnanime neglette ;
 Ma le bell’ alme alle bell’ opre elette
 Sanno gioir nelle fatiche eccelse :
 Nè biasmo popolar, frale catena,
 Spirto d’onore, il suo cammin raffrena.
 Così lunga stagion per modi indegni
 Europa dispregzò l’inclita speme,
 Schernendo il vulgo, e seco i Regi insieme,
 Nudo nocchier, promettitor di Regni ;
 Ma per le sconosciute onde marine
 L’invitta prora ei pur sospinse al fine.
 Qual uom, che torni alla gentil consorte,
 Tal ei da sui magion spiegò l’antenne ;
 L’ocean corse, e i turbini sostenne,
 Vinse le crude immagini di morte ;
 Poscia, dell’ ampio mar spenta la guerra,
 Scorse la dianzi favolosa terra.

Allor dal cavo pin scende veloce,
 E di grand' orma il nuovo mondo imprime ;
 Nè men ratto per l'aria erge sublime,
 Segno del Ciel, l'insuperabil Croce ;
 E porge umile esempio, onde adorarla
 Debba sua gente.

CHIABRERA, P. I. 12.⁷

6⁸ We do not mean to rest our argument on the general utility or importance of Method. Every Science and every Art attests the value of the particular principles on which we have above insisted. In Mathematics they will, doubtless, be readily admitted ; and certainly there are many marked differences between mathematical and physical studies ; but in both a previous act and conception of the mind, or what we have called an *initiative*, is indispensably necessary, even to the mere semblance of Method. In Mathematics, the definition *makes* the object, and pre-establishes the terms, which alone can occur in the after reasoning. If an existing circle, or what is supposed to be such, be found not to have the radii from the centre to the circumference perfectly equal, it will in no manner affect the Mathematician's reasoning on the properties of circles ; it will only prove that the figure in question is not a circle according to the previous definition. A Mathematical Idea, therefore, may be perfect. But the place of a perfect Idea cannot be exactly supplied, in the sciences of experiment and observation, by any theory built on generalization. For what shall determine the mind to one point rather than another ; within what limits, and from what number of individuals, shall the generalization be made ? The theory must still require a prior theory for its own legitimate construction. The Physical definition follows

⁷ *Poesie Liriche Di Chiabrera*, London, 1787, Vol. I, Canzone XII.

⁸ The material of ¶ 6, differently introduced, and supplemented by a quotation from Euler, forms part of Sec. II, Essay VII, ¶ 3 of *The Friend* (1818, Essay VI, ¶ 3).

and does not precede the reasoning. It is representative, not constitutive, and is indeed little more than an abbreviation of the preceding observation, and the deductions therefrom. But as the observation, though aided by experiment, is necessarily limited and imperfect, the definition must be equally so. The history of theories, and the frequency of their subversion by the discovery of a single new fact, supply the best illustrations of this truth.

7⁹ But in Experimental Philosophy, it may be said, how much do we not owe to accident? Doubtless: but let it not be forgotten, that if the discoveries so made stop there; if they do not excite some master IDEA; if they do not lead to some LAW (in whatever dress of theory or hypothesis the fashions and prejudices of the time may disguise or disfigure it); the discoveries may remain for ages limited in their uses, insecure and unproductive. How many centuries, we might have said millennia, have passed since the first accidental discovery of the attraction and repulsion of light bodies by rubbed amber, &c. Compare the interval with the progress made within less than a century, after the discovery of the *phænomena* that led immediately to a theory of ELECTRICITY. That here, as in many other instances, the theory was supported by insecure hypotheses; that by one theorist two heterogeneous fluids were assumed, the vitreous and the resinous; by another, a plus and minus of the same fluid; that a third considered it a mere modification of light; while a fourth composed the electrical aura of oxygen, hydrogen, and caloric: all this does but place the truth we have been insisting on in a stronger and clearer light. For, abstract from all these suppositions, or rather imaginations, that which is common to, and involved in them all; and there will remain neither

⁹ ¶¶ 7 and 8. The passage occurs, much of it *verbatim*, in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay VII, ¶¶ 5, 6 and 7 (1818, Essay VI). It is to this passage that the footnote on Columbus (see above, p. 14) is attached.

notional fluid or fluids; nor chemical compounds, nor elementary matter,—but the Idea of *two—opposite—forces*, tending to rest by equilibrium. These are the sole factors of the calculus, alike in all the theories: these give the *Law* and with it the *Method* of arranging the *phænomena*. For this reason it may not be rash to anticipate the nearest approaches to a correct system of Electricity from those Philosophers, who, since the year 1798,¹⁰ have presented the Idea most distinctly as such, rejecting the hypothesis of any material substratum, and contemplating in all Electrical phenomena the operation of a Law which reigns through all Nature, viz. the law of *polarity*, or the manifestation of one power by opposite forces.

8 How great the contrast between Electricity and MAGNETISM! From the remotest antiquity, the attraction of iron by the magnet was known, and noticed; but century after century it remained the undisturbed property of poets and orators. The fact of the magnet, and the fable of the phoenix, stood on the same scale of utility, and by the generality of mankind, the latter was as much credited as the former, and considered far more interesting. In the XIIIth century, however, or perhaps earlier, the *polarity* of the magnet, and its communicability to iron, were discovered. We remain in doubt whether this discovery were accidental, or the result of theory; if the former, the purpose which it soon suggested was so grand and important, that it may well be deemed the proudest trophy ever yet raised by accident in the service of mankind. But still it furnished no genuine *Idea*; it led to no *Law*, and, consequently, to no *Method*: though a variety of phenomena, as startling as they are at present mysterious, have forced on us a presentiment of its intimate connection

¹⁰ The time at which Galvani, Volta, and others were revolutionizing electrical science.

with other great agencies of Nature. We would not be understood to assume the power of predicting to what extent, or in what directions, that connection may hereafter be traced; but amidst the most ingenious hypotheses that have yet been formed on the subject, we may notice that which, combining the three primary Laws of Magnetism, Electricity, and Galvanism,¹ considers them all as the results of one common power, essential to all material construction in the works of Nature. It is, perhaps, more an operation of the Fancy than of the Reason, which has suggested that these three material powers are analogous to the three dimensions of space.¹¹ Hypothesis, be it observed, can never form the groundwork of a true scientific method, unless when the hypothesis is either a true *Idea* proposed in an hypothetical form, or at least the symbol of an *Idea* as yet unknown, of a Law as yet undiscovered; and in this latter case the hypothesis merely performs the function of an unknown quantity in Algebra, and is assumed for the purpose of submitting the *phænomena* to a scientific calculus. But to recur to the contrast presented by Electricity and Magnetism, in the rapid progress of the former, and the stationary condition of the latter: What is the cause of this diversity? Fewer theories, fewer hypotheses have not been advanced in the one than in the other; but the theories and fictions of the Electricians contained an *Idea*, and all the same *Idea*, which has necessarily led to METHOD; implicit indeed, and only regulative hitherto, but which requires little more than the dismissal of the imagery to become constitutive, like the *Ideas* of the Geometrician. On the contrary, the assumptions of the

¹ See the experiments of Coulomb, Brugmans, and Goethe.¹² To which may be added, should they be confirmed, the curious observations on crystallization, first made in Corsica, and since pursued in France.

¹¹ Cf. Coleridge's *Theory of Life, Miscellaneous* (Ashe), pp. 408, 427 and 428.

¹² Charles Augustin de Coulomb, 1736-1806; Sebald Justin Brugmans, 1763-1819.

Magnetists (as, for instance, the hypothesis that the earth itself is one vast magnet, or that an immense magnet is concealed within it; or that there is a concentric globe within the earth, revolving on its own independent axis) are but repetitions of the same fact or *phænomenon*, looked at through a magnifying glass; the *reiteration* of the problem, not its solution. This leads to the important consideration, so often dwelt upon, so forcibly urged, so powerfully amplified and explained by our great countryman Bacon, that one fact is often worth a thousand. *Satis scimus*, says he, *axiomata recte inventa, tota agmina operum secum trahere*. Hence his indignant reprobation of the *vis experimentalis, cæca, stupida, vaga, prærupta!* Hence his just and earnest exhortations to pursue the *experimenta lucifera*, and those alone; discarding, for their sakes, even the *fructifera experimenta*.¹³ The Natural Philosopher, who cannot, or will not see, that it is the “enlightening” fact, which really causes all the others to *be* facts, in any Scientific sense—he who has not the head to comprehend, and the soul to reverence this parent experiment—he to whom the *εὐρηκα* is not an exclamation of joy and rapture, a rich reward for years of toil and patient suffering—to him no auspicious answer will ever be granted by the Oracle of Nature.

9¹⁴ We have said that improgressive arrangement is not Method, and in proof of this we appeal to the notorious fact, that ZOOLOGY, soon after the commencement of the latter half of the last century, was falling abroad, weighed down and crushed as it were by the inordinate number and multiplicity of facts and *phænomena* apparently separate,

¹³ Cf. *Novum Organum*, Aphorisms (Bk. I) LXX, XCIX, CXXI. The quotations (adapted) do not appear in *The Friend*, but are what one would expect Coleridge to insert.

¹⁴ This illustration from zoology appears in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay VII, ¶ 2 (1818, Essay VI, ¶ 2), before the discussion of electricity and magnetism.

without evincing the least promise of systematizing itself by any inward combination of its parts. JOHN HUNTER, who had appeared, at times, almost a stranger to the grand conception, which yet never ceased to work in him, as his genius and governing spirit, rose at length in the horizon of Physiology and Comparative Anatomy. In his printed Works, the finest elements of system seem evermore to flit before him, twice or thrice only to have been seized, and after a momentary detention, to have been again suffered to escape. At length, in the astonishing preparations for his Museum, he constructed it, for the Scientific apprehension, out of the unspoken alphabet of Nature. Yet notwithstanding the imperfection in the annunciation of the Idea, how exhilarating have been the results ! It may, we believe, be affirmed, with safety, that whatever is grandest in the views of CUVIER, is either a reflection of this light, or a continuation of its rays, well and wisely directed, through fit media, to its appropriate object.

10¹⁵ From Zoology, or the laws of animal life, to BOTANY, or those of vegetable life, the transition is easy and Natural. In this pursuit, how striking is the necessity of a clear *Idea*, as initiative of all Method ! How obvious the importance of attention to the conduct of the Mind in the exercise of Method itself ! The lowest attempt at Botanical arrangement consists in an artificial classification of plants, for the preparatory purpose of a nomenclature ; but even in this, some *antecedent* must have been contributed by the Mind itself ; some *purpose* must be in view ; or some question at least must have been proposed to

¹⁵ ¶ 10. Except for the introductory sentence the paragraph is used, much of it *verbatim*, in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay VI, ¶ 3 ; 1818, Essay V, ¶¶ 7 and 8 ; Bohn, Essay VI, ¶¶ 3 and 4. *The Friend* in the following paragraph gives Coleridge's own anticipation of the idea of a "harmony of contrasts" between vegetable and animal life.

Nature, grounded, as all questions are, upon *some* Idea of the answer. As for instance, the assumption,

That two great sexes animate the world. ¹⁶

For no man can confidently conceive a fact to be universally true who does not proportionally anticipate its necessity, and who does not believe that necessity to be demonstrable by an insight into its nature, whenever and wherever such insight can be obtained. We acknowledge, we reverence, the obligations of Botany to LINNÆUS, who adopting from Bartholinus ¹⁷ and others the sexuality of plants, grounded thereon a scheme of classific and distinctive marks, by which one man's experience may be communicated to others, and the objects safely reasoned on while absent, and recognized as soon as and wherever they occur. He invented an universal character for the Language of Botany, chargeable with no greater imperfections than are to be found in the alphabets of every particular Language. The first requisites in investigating the works of Nature, as in studying the Classics, are a proper Accidence and Dictionary; and for both of these Botany is indebted to the illustrious Swede. But the inherent necessity, the true *Idea* of Sex, was never fully contemplated by Linnæus, much less that of vegetation itself. Wanting these master-lights, he was not only unable to discern the collateral relations of the Vegetable to the Mineral and Animal Worlds; but even in respect to the doctrine which gives name and character to his system, he only avoided Scylla to fall upon Charybdis: and such must be the case of every one, who in this uncertain state of the initiative Idea, ventures to expatiate among the subordinate notions. If we adhere to the general notion of sex, as abstracted from the more obvious modes in which the sexual relation manifests

¹⁶ Cf. *Paradise Lost*, Bk. VIII, l. 151, "Which two . . ."

¹⁷ Thomas Bartholinus, 1616-1680.

itself, we soon meet with whole classes of plants to which it is found inapplicable. If, arbitrarily, we give it indefinite extension, it is dissipated into the barren truism, that all specific products suppose specific *means* of production. Thus a growth and a birth are distinguished by the mere verbal definition, that the latter is a whole in itself, the former not : and when we would apply even this to Nature, we are baffled by objects (the flower polypus, &c. &c.) in which each is the other. All that can be done by the most patient and active industry, by the widest and most continuous researches : all that the amplest survey of the vegetable realm, brought under immediate contemplation by the most stupendous collections of species and varieties, can suggest ; all that minutest dissection and exactest chemical analysis can unfold ; all that varied experiment and the position of plants and their component parts in every conceivable relation to light, heat, and whatever else we distinguish as imponderable substances ; to earth, air, water ; to the supposed constituents of air and water, separate and in all proportions—in short, all that chemical agents and reagents can disclose or adduce ;—all these have been brought, as conscripts, into the field, with the completest accoutrement, in the best discipline, under the ablest commanders. Yet after all that was effected by Linnaeus himself, not to mention the labours of Cæsalpinus, Ray, Gesner, Tournefort, ¹⁸ and the other heroes who preceded the general adoption of the Sexual system, as the basis of artificial arrangement—after all the successive toils and enterprises of HEDWIG, JUSSIEU, MIRBEL, SMITH, KNIGHT, ELLIS, &c. &c.¹⁹—what is BOTANY at this present

¹⁸ Andrea Cæsalpinus, 1519–1603 ; John Ray, 1628–1705 ; Konrad von Gesner, 1516–1565 ; Joseph Pitton de Tournefort, 1656–1708.

¹⁹ Johann Hedwig, 1730–1799 ; probably Antoine Laurant de Jussieu, 1748–1836 ; Charles François Brisseau de Mirbel, 1776–1854 ; Sir James Edward Smith, 1759–1828 ; Thomas Andrew Knight, 1758–1838 ; John Ellis, c. 1710–1776.

hour? Little more than an enormous nomenclature; a huge catalogue, *bien arrangé*, yearly and monthly augmented, in various editions, each with its own scheme of technical memory and its own conveniences of reference! The innocent amusement, the healthful occupation, the ornamental accomplishment of *amateurs*; it has yet to expect the devotion and energies of the philosopher. Whether the *Idea* which has glanced across some minds, that the harmony between the Vegetable and Animal World is not a harmony of resemblance, but of contrast, may not lead to a new and more accurate Method in this engaging Science, it becomes us not here to determine; but should its objective truth be hereafter demonstrated by induction of facts in an unbroken series of correspondences in Nature, we shall then receive it as a *Law* of organic existence; and shall thence obtain another splendid proof, that with the knowledge of Law alone dwell power and prophecy, decisive experiment, and scientific Method.

11²⁰ Such, too, is the case with the substances of the LABORATORY, which are assumed to be incapable of decomposition. They are mere exponents of some one Law, which the Chemical Philosopher, whatever may be his Theory, is incessantly labouring to discover. The Law, indeed, has not yet assumed the form of an *Idea* in his Mind; it is what we have called an *Instinct*; it is a pursuit after unity of principle, through a diversity of forms. Thus as "the lunatic, the lover, and the poet," suggest each other to Shakspeare's Theseus, as soon as his thoughts present to him^{20a} the ONE FORM, of which they are but varieties; so water and flame, the diamond, the charcoal, and the mantling champagne, with its ebullient sparkles,

²⁰ ¶ 11. This discussion of chemistry appears, slightly amplified, in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay VI, ¶ 5 (1818, Essay V, ¶ 10; Bohn, Essay VI, ¶ 6).

^{20a} First edition omits "to."

are convoked and fraternized by the theory of the Chemist. This is, in truth, the first charm of Chemistry, and the secret of the almost universal interest excited by its discoveries. The serious complacency which is afforded by the sense of truth, utility, permanence, and progression, blends with and ennobles the exhilarating surprise and the pleasurable sting of curiosity, which accompany the propounding and the solving of an enigma. It is the sense of a principle of connection given by the mind, and sanctioned by the correspondency of Nature. Hence the strong hold which in all ages Chemistry has had on the imagination. If in the greatest poets we find Nature idealized through the creative power of a profound yet observant meditation, so through the meditative observation of a DAVY, a WOLLASTON, a HATCHETT, or a MURRAY,²¹

By some connatural force,
Powerful at greatest distance to unite
With secret amity things of like kind,²²

we find poetry, as it were, substantiated and realized.

¹² ²³ This consideration leads us from the paths of Physical Science into a region apparently very different. Those who tread the enchanted ground of POETRY, oftentimes do not even suspect that there is such a thing as *Method* to guide their steps. Yet even here we undertake to show that it not only has a necessary existence, but the strictest Philosophical application; and that it is founded on the very Philosophy which has furnished us with the Principles already laid down. It may surprise some of our

²¹ Coleridge's interest in the work of his friend Sir Humphry Davy is well known. William Hyde Wollaston, 1766-1828; Charles Hatchett, c. 1765-1847; probably John Murray, c. 1786-1851, writer on physics and chemistry.

²² Cf. *Paradise Lost*, Bk. X, ll. 246-8, "Or some . . ."

²³ ¶ 12. *The Friend* does not contain this transitional introduction to Shakspeare. (On the different uses made of Shakspearean material in the two versions see above, p. xxvi.) The point about individuality and portraiture is made near the end of Essay IV (¶ 16). The illustration from *Henry IV* is used much earlier in the essay (¶ 5).

readers, especially those who have been brought up in Schools of foreign taste, to find that we rest our proof of these assertions on one single evidence, and that that evidence is SHAKSPEARE, whose Mind they have, probably, been taught to consider as eminently *immethodical*. In the first place, Shakspeare was not only endowed with great native genius (which indeed he is commonly allowed to have been), but what is less frequently conceded, he had much acquired knowledge. "His information," says Professor WILDE,²⁴ "was great and extensive, and his reading as great as his knowledge of Languages could reach. Considering the bar which his education and circumstances placed in his way, he had done as much to acquire knowledge as even Milton. A thousand instances might be given of the intimate knowledge that Shakspeare had of facts. I shall mention only one. I do not say, he gives a good account of the Salic law, though a much worse has been given by many antiquaries. But he who reads the Archbishop of Canterbury's speech in *Henry the Fifth*, and who shall afterwards say that Shakspeare was not a man of great reading and information, and who loved the thing itself, is a person whose opinion I would not ask or trust upon any matter of investigation." Then was all this reading, all this information, all this knowledge of our great dramatist, a mere *rudis indigestaque moles*?²⁵ Very far from it. Method, we have seen, demands a knowledge of the relations which things bear to each other, or to the observer, or to the state and apprehension of the hearers. In all and each of these was Shakspeare so deeply versed, that in the personages of a play, he seems "to mould his mind as some incorporeal material alternately into all their

²⁴ This quotation from "Professor Wilde" is not given in *The Friend*. Is the name "Wilde" possibly a misprint? Critics have not identified him.

²⁵ Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, Bk. I, l. 7.

various forms.”² In every one of his various characters we still feel ourselves communing with the same human nature. Everywhere we find individuality: nowhere mere portrait. The excellence of his productions consists in a happy union of the universal with the particular. But the universal is an *Idea*. Shakspeare, therefore, studied mankind in the *Idea* of the human race; and he followed out that *Idea* into all its varieties, by a *Method* which never failed to guide his steps aright. Let us appeal to him to illustrate, by example, the difference between a sterile and an exuberant²⁶ mind, in respect to what we have ventured to call the Science of Method. On the one hand observe Mrs. Quickly’s relation of the circumstances of Sir John Falstaff’s debt:—

FALSTAFF. What is the gross sum that I owe thee?

Mrs. QUICKLY. Marry, if thou wert an honest man, thyself and the money too. Thou didst swear to me upon a parcel-gilt goblet, sitting in my dolphin chamber, at the round table, by a sea-coal fire, on Wednesday in Whitsun week, when the prince broke thy head for likening his father to a singing man in Windsor—thou didst swear to me then, as I was washing thy wound, to marry me and make me my lady thy wife. Canst thou deny it? Did not goodwife Keech, the Butcher’s wife, come in then and call me gossip Quickly?—coming in to borrow a mess of vinegar: telling us she had a good dish of prawns—whereby thou didst desire to eat some—whereby I told thee they were ill for a green wound,” &c. &c. &c.

(*Henry IV. P. I. Act II. Scene I.*)²⁷

13²⁸ On the other hand consider the narration given by Hamlet to Horatio, of the occurrences during his proposed transportation to England, and the events that interrupted his voyage. (*Act V. Scene II.*)

² ὁ τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν ὥσει ἕλην τινα ἀσάματον μορφαῖς ποικιλαῖς μορφώσας.
THEMISTIUS.

²⁶ In *The Friend* these adjectives are replaced by “uncultivated” and “well disciplined,” more pertinent to the argument at this point.

²⁷ This should read “Part II.”

²⁸ ¶ 13. In *The Friend* the illustration from *Hamlet* is separated from the preceding by a paragraph of comment, Sec. II, Essay IV, ¶ 6.

HAM. Sir, in my heart there was a kind of fighting
 That would not let me sleep : methought I lay
 Worse than the mutines in the bilboes. Rashly,
 And prais'd be rashness for it—*Let us know,*
Our indiscretion sometimes serves us well,
When our deep plots do fail : and that should teach us
There's a Divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough-hew them how we will.

HOR. That is most certain.

HAM. Up from my cabin,
 My sea-gown scarf'd about me, in the dark
 Grop'd I to find out them ; had my desire ;
 Finger'd their packet ; and, in fine, withdrew
 To my own room again : making so bold,
My fears forgetting manners, to unseal
 Their grand commission ; where I found, Horatio,
 A royal knavery—an exact command,
Larded with many several sorts of reasons,
Importing Denmark's health, and England's too,
 With ho ! such bugs and goblins in *my* life,
 That on the supervise, no leisure bated,
 No, not to stay the grinding of the axe,
 My head should be struck off !

HOR. Is't possible ?

HAM. Here's the commission—Read it at more leisure.²⁹

I sat me down ;
 Devis'd a new commission ; wrote it fair.
I once did hold it, as our statists do,
A baseness to write fair, and labour'd much
How to forget that learning ; but, sir, now
 It did me yeoman's service. Wilt thou know
 The effect of what I wrote ?

HOR. Ay, good my lord.

HAM. An earnest conjuration from the king,
 As England was his faithful tributary ;
As love between them, like the palm, might flourish ;
As peace should still her wheaten garland wear,
And many such like As's of great charge—
 That, on the view and knowing of these contents,
 He should the bearers put to sudden death,
 No shriving time allowed.³⁰

²⁹ Several lines of the text are omitted.

³⁰ Two lines of this speech are omitted.

HOR. How was this sealed ?

HAM. Why, even in that was heaven ordant.
 I had my father's signet in my purse,
 Which was the model of that Danish seal :
 Folded the writ up in the form of the other ;
 Subscribed it ; gave't the impression ; plac'd it safely,
 The changeling never known. Now, the next day
 Was our sea-fight ; and what to this was sequent
 Thou knowest already.³¹

14 ³² If, overlooking the different value of the matter in these two narrations, we consider only the form, it must be confessed that both are *immethodical*. We have asserted that Method results from a balance between the passive impression received from outward things, and the internal activity of the mind in reflecting and generalizing ; but neither Hamlet nor the Hostess holds this balance accurately. In Mrs. Quickly, the memory alone is called into action, the objects and events recur in the narration in the same order, and with the same accompaniments, however accidental or impertinent, as they had first occurred to the narrator. The necessity of taking breath, the efforts of recollection, and the abrupt rectification of its failures, produce all her pauses, and constitute most of her connections. But when we look to the Prince of Denmark's recital the case is widely different. Here the events, with the circumstances of time and place, are all stated with equal compression and rapidity ; not one introduced which could have been omitted without injury to the intelligibility of the whole process. If any tendency is discoverable, as far as the mere facts are in question, it is to omission : and accordingly the reader will observe that the attention of the narrator is called back to one material circumstance, which he was hurrying by, by a direct question (HOW WAS THIS

³¹ *The Friend* quotes a few more lines.

³² The comments made in ¶ 14 occur in *The Friend* in Sec. II, Essay IV ¶¶ 2, 8 and 9.

SEALED ?) from the friend ^{32a} to whom the story is communicated. But by a trait, which is indeed peculiarly characteristic of Hamlet's mind, ever disposed to generalize, and meditative to excess, all the digressions and enlargements consist of reflections, truths, and principles of general and permanent interest, either directly expressed or disguised in playful satire.

15 ³³ Instances of the want of generalization are of no rare occurrence ; and the narration of Shakspeare's Hostess differs from those of the ignorant and unthinking in ordinary life, only by its superior humour, the poet's own gift and infusion, not by its want of Method, which is not greater than we often meet with in that class of minds of which she is the dramatic representative. Nor will the excess of generalization and reflection have escaped our observation in real life, though the great Poet has more conveniently supplied the illustrations. In attending too exclusively to the relations which the past or passing events and objects bear to general truth, and the moods of his own mind, the most intelligent man is sometimes in danger of overlooking that other relation, in which they are likewise to be placed to the apprehension and sympathies of his hearers. His discourse appears like soliloquy intermixed with dialogue. But the uneducated and unreflecting talker overlooks *all* mental relations, and consequently precludes all Method that is not purely accidental. Hence, the nearer the things and incidents in time and place, the more distant, disjointed, and impertinent to each other, and to any common purpose, will they appear in his narration : and this from the absence of any leading thought in the narrator's own mind. On the contrary, where the habit of Method is

^{32a} In the first edition "How was this sealed ?" stood after "friend."

³³ ¶ 15 appears, amplified, in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay IV, ¶¶ 10 and 11. The quotation from Themistius (see above, p. 27) occurs here.

present and effective, things the most remote and diverse in time, place, and outward circumstance, are brought into mental contiguity and succession, the more striking as the less expected. But while we would impress the necessity of this habit, the illustrations adduced give proof that in undue preponderance, and when the prerogative of the mind is stretched into despotism, the discourse may degenerate into the wayward, or the fantastical.

16³⁴ Shakspeare needed not to read Horace in order to give his characters that Methodical *Unity* which the wise Roman so strongly recommends :—

Si quid inexpertum scenæ committis, et audes
Personam formare novam ; servetur ad imum
Qualis ab incepto processerit, et sibi constet.³⁵

But this was not the only way in which he followed an accurate Philosophic Method ; we quote the expressions of SCHLEGEL, a foreign critic of great and deserved reputation :—" If Shakspeare deserves our admiration for his characters, he is equally deserving of it for his exhibition of *Passion*, taking this word in its widest signification as including every mental condition, every tone, from indifference or familiar mirth to the wildest rage and despair. He gives us the history of minds : *he lays open to us, in a single word, a whole series of preceding conditions.*"³⁶ This last is a profound and exquisite remark : and it necessarily implies, that Shakspeare contemplated *Ideas*, in which alone are involved conditions and consequences *ad infinitum*. Purblind critics, whose mental vision could not reach far

³⁴ This paragraph, with its references to Horace and Schlegel, does not appear in *The Friend*, but there is no reason for questioning its authorship. For an up-to-date discussion of Coleridge's relations to German critics of Shakspeare see the Introduction and Notes *passim* of *Coleridge's Shakespearean Criticism* (Raysor).

³⁵ *Ars Poetica*, ll. 125-7.

³⁶ Coleridge evidently used John Black's translation. Cf. Black's edition of A. W. Schlegel's *Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature*, London, 1815, II, 132.

enough to comprise the whole dimensions of our poetical Hercules, have busied themselves in measuring and spanning him muscle by muscle, till they fancied they had discovered some disproportion. There are two answers applicable to most of such remarks. First, that Shakspeare understood the true language and external workings of Passion better than his critics. He had a higher, and a more Ideal, and consequently a more Methodical sense of harmony than they. A very slight knowledge of Music will enable any one to detect discords in the exquisite harmonies of HAYDN or MOZART; and Bentley has found more false grammar in the PARADISE LOST than ever poor boy was whipped for through all the forms of Eton or Westminster; but to know why the minor note is introduced into the major key, or the nominative case left to seek for its verb, requires an acquaintance with some preliminary steps of the Methodical scale, at the top of which sits the author, and at the bottom the critic. The second answer is, that Shakspeare was pursuing two Methods at once; and besides the Psychological³ Method, he had also to attend to the Poetical. Now the Poetical Method requires above all things a preponderance of pleasurable feeling: and where the interest of the events and characters and passions is too strong to be continuous without becoming painful, there Poetical Method requires that there should be what Schlegel calls "a musical alleviation of our sympathy."³⁷ The Lydian mode must temper the Dorian. This we call Method.

17³⁸ We said that Shakspeare pursued two Methods.

³ We beg pardon for the use of this *insolens verbum*; but it is one of which our language stands in great need. We have no single term to express the Philosophy of the Human Mind: and what is worse, the Principles of that Philosophy are commonly called *Metaphysical*, a word of very different meaning.

³⁷ *Op. cit.*, II, 134.

³⁸ ¶¶ 17-20 do not appear in *The Friend*, but the points made are much what one would expect on the basis of Coleridge's other criticisms of Shakspeare.

Oh ! he pursued many, many more—"both oar and sail"—and the guidance of the helm, and the heaving of the lead, and the watchful observation of the stars, and the thunder of his grand artillery. What shall we say of his Moral conceptions ? Not made up of miserable clap-traps, and the tag-ends of mawkish Novels and endless sermonizing ;—but furnishing lessons of profound meditation to frail and fallible Human Nature. He shows us Crime and Want of Principle clothed not with a spurious greatness of soul, but with a force of intellect which too often imposes but the more easily on the weak, misjudging multitude. He shows us the innocent mind of Othello plunged by its own unsuspecting, and therefore unwatchful confidence, into guilt and misery not to be endured. Look at Lear, look at Richard, look in short at every Moral picture of this mighty Moralist ! Whoso does not rise from their attentive perusal "a sadder and a wiser man"—let him never dream that he knows anything of Philosophical Method.

18 Nay, even in his style, how Methodical is our "sweet Shakspeare." Sweetness is, indeed, its predominant characteristic ; and it has a few immethodical luxuriations of wit ; and he may occasionally be convicted of words, which convey a volume of thought, when the business of the scene did not absolutely require such deep meditation. But pardoning him these *dulcia vitia*, who ever fashioned the English Language, or any Language, ancient or modern, into such variety of appropriate apparel, from "the gorgeous pall of scepter'd tragedy,"³⁹ to the easy dress of flowing pastoral ?

More musical than lark to shepherd's ear,
When wheat is green and hawthorn buds appear.⁴⁰

³⁹ Adapted from *Il Penseroso*, ll. 97-8.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Midsummer Night's Dream*, I, 1. "More tuneable . . ."

Who, like him, could so Methodically suit the very flow and tone of discourse to characters lying so widely apart in rank, and habits, and peculiarities, as Holofernes and Queen Katharine, Falstaff and Lear? When we compare the pure English style of Shakspeare with that of the very best writers of his day, we stand astonished at the *Method* by which he was directed in the choice of those words and idioms, which are as fresh now as in their first bloom; nay, which are at the present moment at once more energetic, more expressive, more natural, and more elegant, than those of the happiest and most admired living speakers or writers.

19 But Shakspeare was “not Methodical in the structure of his Fable.” Oh, gentle critic! be advised. Do not trust too much to your professional dexterity in the use of the scalping knife and tomahawk. Weapons of diviner mould are wielded by your adversary: and you are meeting him here on his own peculiar ground, the ground of *Idea*, of Thought, and of inspiration. The very point of this dispute is Ideal. The question is one of *Unity*: and Unity, as we have shown, is wholly the subject of Ideal law. There are said to be three great Unities which Shakspeare has violated; those of Time, Place, and Action. Now the Unities of Time and Place we will not dispute about. Be ours the Poet,

*qui pectus inaniter angit
Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet
Ut magus, et modo me Thebis, modo ponit Athenis.*^{40a}

The Dramatist who circumscribes himself within that Unity of Time which is regulated by a stop-watch, may be exact, but is not Methodical; or his Method is of the least and lowest class. But

Where is he living clipt in with the sea,
That chides the banks of England, Wales, or Scotland,⁴¹

^{40a} Horace, *Epistles*, II, 1, ll. 211 ff.

⁴¹ *Henry IV, Part I*, III, 1.

who can transpose the scenes of Macbeth, and make the seated heart knock at the ribs with the same force as now it does, when the mysterious tale is conducted from the open hearth, on which the Weird Sisters are ushered in with thunder and lightning, to the fatal fight of Dunsinane, in which their victim expiates with life, his credulity and his ambition? To the disgrace of the English Stage, such attempts have, indeed, been made on almost all the Dramas of Shakspeare. Scarcely a season passes which does not produce some *ὑστερον πρότερον* of this kind, in which the mangled limbs of our great Poet are thrown together "in most admired disorder."⁴² There was once a noble Author, who, by a refined species of murder, cut up the play of Julius Cæsar into two good set Tragedies.⁴³ Voltaire we believe, had the grace to make but one of it; but whether his Brutus be an improvement on the model from which it was taken, we trust, after what we have already said, we shall hardly be expected to discuss.

20 Thus we have seen that Shakspeare's mind, rich in stores of acquired knowledge, commanded all these stores and rendered them disposable, by means of his intimate acquaintance with the great laws of Thought, which form and regulate Method. We have seen him exemplifying the opposite faults of Method in two different characters; we have seen that he was himself Methodical in the delineation of character, in the display of Passion, in the conceptions of Moral Being, in the adaptations of Language, in the connection and admirable intertexture of his ever-interesting Fable. Let it not after this be said that Poetry—and under the word Poetry⁴⁴ we will now take leave to

⁴² Cf. *Macbeth*, III, 4, "with most . . ."

⁴³ Referring probably to *Julius Cæsar* and *Marcus Brutus* by John Sheffield, Duke of Buckinghamshire; published 1722.

⁴⁴ Cf. manuscript fragment, p. 85 below, and *On Poesy or Art*, published with notes in Shawcross's *Biographia Literaria*, II, 255.

include all the Works of the higher Imagination, whether operating by measured sound, or by the harmonies of form and colour, or by words, the more immediate and universal representatives of Thought—is not strictly Methodical; nay, does not owe its whole charm, and all its beauty, and all its power, to the Philosophical Principles of Method.

21⁴⁵ But what of Philosophy herself? Shall she be exempted from the Laws, which she has imposed on all the rest of the known Universe? *Longe absit!* To Philosophy properly belongs the EDUCATION of the Mind: and all that we have hitherto said may be regarded as an indication (we have room for no more) of the chief Laws and regulative Principles of that education. Philosophy, the “Parent of Life,” according to the expression of the wise Roman Orator; the “Mother of Good Deeds and of Good Sayings,” the “Medicine of the Mind,” is herself wholly conversant with Method.

22⁴⁶ True it is that the Ancients, as well as the Moderns, had their machinery for the extemporaneous coinage of intellect, by means of which the scholar was enabled *to make a figure* on any and all subjects, on any and all occasions. They too had their glittering vapours which, (as the Comic Poet tells us) fed a host of Sophists—

μεγάλαι θεαὶ ἀνδράσιν ἀργοῖς,
αἵ περ γνῶμην καὶ διδλεξιν καὶ νοῦν ἡμῖν παρέχουσι,
καὶ τερατεῖαν, καὶ περίλεξιν, καὶ κροῦσιν, καὶ κατὰληψιν.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΦ., Νεφ. 316.

Great goddesses are they to lazy folks,
Who pour down on us gifts of fluent speech,
Sense most sententious, wonderful fine *effect*,
And how to talk about it and about it,
Thoughts brisk as bees, and pathos soft and thawy.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ ¶ 21. This transitional paragraph does not occur in *The Friend*.

⁴⁶ The material of ¶ 22, through the quotation, is used in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay VII, ¶ 1 (1818, Essay VI, ¶ 1), but following the argument that it here precedes.

⁴⁷ First edition reads “thawing.”

But the Philosophers held a course very different from that of the Sophists. We shall not trouble our readers with a comparative view of many Systems, but we shall present to their admiration one mighty Ancient, and one illustrious Modern, PLATO and BACON. These two varieties will sufficiently exemplify the species.

23 ⁴⁸ Of PLATO'S Works, the larger and more valuable portion have all one common end, which comprehends and shines through the particular purpose of each several Dialogue ; and this is, to establish the sources, to evolve the Principles, and to exemplify the ART of METHOD. This is the clue, without which it would be difficult to exculpate the noblest productions of the " Divine " Philosopher from the charge of being tortuous and labyrinthine in their progress, and unsatisfactory in their ostensible results. The latter, indeed, appear not seldom to have been drawn, for the purpose of starting a new problem, rather than of solving the one proposed as the subject of previous discussion. But with the clear insight that the purpose of the writer is not so much to establish any particular truth, as to remove the obstacles, the continuance of which is preclusive of all truth, the whole scheme assumes a different aspect, and justifies itself in all its dimensions. We see that the EDUCATION of the Intellect, by awakening the *Method* of self-development, was his proposed object, not any specific information that can be *conveyed into it* from without. He desired not to assist in storing the passive Mind with the various sorts of knowledge most in request, as if the Human Soul were a mere repository, or banqueting-room, but to place it in such relations of circumstance as should gradually excite its vegetating and germinating powers to produce new fruits of Thought, new Conceptions, and Imaginations,

⁴⁸ ¶ 23, to the words "Plato was a Poetic Philosopher," occurs practically *verbatim* in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay VII, ¶ 1 (1818, Essay VI, ¶ 1).

and Ideas.⁴⁹ Plato was a Poetic Philosopher, as Shakspeare was a Philosophic Poet.⁵⁰ In the Poetry, as well as in the Philosophy of both, there was a necessary predominance of Ideas; but this did not make them regardless of the actual existences around them.⁵¹ They were not visionaries, nor mystics; but dwelt in "the sober certainty" of waking knowledge. It is strange, yet characteristic of the spirit that was at work during the latter half of the last century, that the writings of PLATO⁵² should be accused of estranging the Mind from plain experience and substantial *matter-of-fact*, and of debauching it by fictions and generalities. Plato, whose Method is inductive throughout, who argues on all subjects not only *from*, but *in* and *by*, inductions of facts! who warns us, indeed, against the usurpation of the Senses, but far oftener, and with more unmitigated hostility, pursues the assumptions, abstractions, generalities, and verbal legerdemain of the Sophists. Strange! but still more strange, that a notion so groundless should be entitled to plead in its behalf the authority of Lord BACON, whose scheme of Logic, as applied to the contemplation of Nature, is Platonic throughout!⁵³ It is necessary that we should explain this circumstance at some length, in order to establish, by the concurrence of authorities, vulgarly supposed to be contradictory, the truth of a System which we have already maintained on so many other grounds.

24⁵⁴ What Lord Bacon was to England, Cicero was to

⁴⁹ "new conceptions . . . Ideas" is omitted in *The Friend*.

⁵⁰ The transitional idea of this sentence introduces the paragraph in *The Friend*.

⁵¹ This sentence and the one following are omitted in *The Friend*.

⁵² The following introduction to the comparison of Plato and Bacon does not occur in *The Friend* until Sec. II, Essay VIII, ¶ 1 (1818, Essay VII); there it is considerably amplified.

⁵³ Note the qualification of this point in *The Friend*: "and differing only in the mode . . .," Sec. II, Essay VIII, ¶ 1 (1818, VII).

⁵⁴ ¶¶ 24 and 25. The references to Cicero do not appear in *The Friend*. The explanation of Bacon's failure to appreciate Plato is given in a note to Sec. II, Essay VI, ¶ 3 (1818, Essay V, ¶ 8; Bohn, Essay VI, ¶ 4), in a different context. Bacon's weaknesses are discussed at greater length and in different terms in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay VIII, ¶ 2 (1818, Essay VII).

Rome—the first and most eloquent advocate of Philosophy. It is needless to remind the classical scholar of that almost religious veneration with which the accomplished Roman speaks of Plato, whom indeed he calls, in one instance, *deus ille noster*, and in other places “the Homer of Philosophers;” their “Prince;” the “most weighty of all who ever spoke, or ever wrote;” “most wise, most holy, divine.” This last appellation, too, it is well known, long remained, even among Christians, as a distinguishing epithet of the great ornament of the Socratic School. Why Bacon should have spoken detractingly of a such a man,—why he should have stigmatized him with the name of “Sophist,” and described his Philosophy (with the tyrant Dionysius), as *verba otiosorum senum ad imperitos juvenes*,⁵⁵ it is much easier to explain than to justify, or even to palliate. He was, perhaps, influenced in part by the tone given to thinking Minds by the Reformation; the founders and fathers of which saw in the Aristotelians, or Schoolmen, the antagonists of Protestantism, and in the Italian Platonists (as they conceived) the secret enemies of Christianity itself. In part, too, Bacon may have formed his notions of Plato’s doctrines from the absurdities of his misinterpreters, rather than from an unprejudiced and diligent study of his Works. Be it remembered, however, that this unfairness was not less manifested to his contemporaries; that his treatment of GILBERT⁵⁶ was cold, invidious, and unjust; and that he seems to have disdained to learn either the existence or the name of Shakspeare. At this conduct no one can be surprised who has studied the life of this

wisest, brightest, meanest of mankind.

But our present business is not with his weaknesses, or his failings, but with those Philosophical Principles which, especially

⁵⁵ *Novum Organum*, Aphorism (Bk. I) LXXI.

⁵⁶ William Gilbert, c. 1540–1603.

as displayed in the *Novum Organum*, have deservedly obtained for him the veneration of succeeding Ages.

25 Those who talk superficially about Bacon's Philosophy, that is to say, nineteen-twentieths of those who talk about it at all, know little more than his induction, and the application which he makes of his own Method to particular classes of Physical facts ; applications which are at least as crude, for the Age of Gilbert, Galileo, and Kepler, as were those of Aristotle (whom he so superciliously reprehends) for the Age of Philip and Alexander. Or they may, perhaps, have been struck with his recommendation of tabular collections of particulars, and hence have placed him at the head of a Body of men, but too numerous in modern days—the Minute Philosophers. We need scarcely say that this is venturing his reputation on a very tottering basis. Let any unprejudiced Naturalist turn to Bacon's questions and proposals for the investigation of single problems ; to his " Discourse on the Winds ;" or to what may almost be called a caricature of his scheme, in the " Method of improving Natural Philosophy," by ROBERT HOOKE⁴ (the history of whose Philosophical life is alone a sufficient answer to all such schemes)—and then let him fairly say whether any desirable end could reasonably be

⁴ We refer particularly to p. 22 to 42 of the above-mentioned Work ; and we would, above all, notice the following admirable specimen of confused and disorderly minuteness⁵⁷ :—" The history of potters, tobacco-pipe-makers, glaziers, glass-grinders, looking-glass-makers or foilers, spectacle-makers and optic-glass makers, makers of counterfeit pearl and precious stones, bugle-makers, lamp-blowers, colour-makers, colour-grinders, glass-painters, enamellers, varnishers, colour-sellers, *painters, limners, picture-drawers, makers of baby-heads, of little bowling stones or marbles, fustian-makers, (query, whether Poets are included in this trade ?)* music-masters, tinsey-makers, and taggers ;—the history of school-masters, writing-masters, printers, book-binders, stage-players, dancing-masters, and vaulters, *apothecaries, surgeons, seamsters, butchers, barbers, laundresses, and cosmetics !* &c. &c. &c. (the true nature of each of which being exactly determined,) WILL HUGELY FACILITATE OUR INQUIRIES IN PHILOSOPHY !!!"

In parallel, or rather in contrast, with the advice of Mr. Robert Hooke, may be fairly placed that of the celebrated Dr. WATTS, which was thought by Dr. KNOX

⁵⁷ Coleridge has condensed the passage.

hoped for, from this process—whether by this mode of research any important discovery ever was made, or ever could be made? Bacon, indeed, always takes care to tell us that the sole purpose and object of collecting together these particulars is to concentrate them, by careful selection, into universals; but so immense is their number, and so various and almost endless the relations in which each is to be separately considered, that the life of an antediluvian Patriarch would be expended, and his strength and spirits wasted, long before he could commence the process of simplification, or arrive in sight of the Law, which was to reward the toils of the over-tasked PSYCHE.⁵

26⁵⁹ Had Bacon done no more than propose these impracticable projects, we should have been far from sharing the sentiments of respect everywhere attached to his Philosophical character. But he has performed a task of infinitely greater importance, by constructing that Methodical System, which is so elegantly developed in the *Novum Organum*. It is this which we propose to compare with the Principles long before enunciated by Plato. In both cases the inductions are frequently as crude and erroneous as to be worthy of insertion in the *Elegant Extracts*,⁶⁰ vol. ii. p. 456, under the head of

DIRECTIONS CONCERNING OUR IDEAS.

"Furnish yourselves with a *rich variety of Ideas*. Acquaint yourselves with *things* ancient and modern, *things* Natural, Civil, and Religious; *things* of your native land, and of foreign countries; *things* domestic and national; *things* present, past, and future; and above all, be well acquainted with God and yourselves; with animal nature, and the workings of your own spirits. *Such a general acquaintance with things will be of very great advantage.*"

⁵ See the beautiful allegoric tale of Cupid and Psyche in the original of Apuleius. The tasks imposed on the hapless nymph, through the jealousy of her mother-in-law, and the agency by which they are at length self-performed are noble instances of that hidden wisdom "where more is meant than meets the ear!"

⁵⁹ Cf. 2nd edition, London, 1784, Bk. IV, p. 456; inexactly quoted.

⁶⁰ The fundamental identity of Plato's and Bacon's principles of method is stated in *The Friend* at the close of Sec. II, Essay VIII (1818, Essay VII). The transitional point, "We do not see, . . ." is made near the opening of Essay IX, middle of ¶ 2 (1818, Essay VIII).

might readily be anticipated from the infant state of Natural History, Chemistry, and Physiology, in their several Ages. In both cases the proposed applications are often impracticable ; but setting aside these considerations, and extracting from each writer that which constitutes his true Philosophy, we shall be convinced that it is identical, in regard to the Science of Method, and to the grounds and conditions of that Science. We do not see, therefore, how we can more appropriately conclude this section of our inquiry than by a brief statement of our renowned Countryman's own Principles of Method, conveyed, for the greater part, in his own words ; or in what more precise form we can recapitulate the substance of the doctrines asserted and vindicated in the preceding pages. For we rest our strongest pretensions to approbation on the fact, that we have only re-proclaimed the coinciding precepts of the Athenian Verulam and the British Plato.^{59a}

27⁶⁰ In the first instance, Lord Bacon, equally with ourselves, demands, as the motive and guide of every Philosophical experiment, what we have ventured to call the intellectual or mental *initiative* ; namely, some well-grounded purpose, some distinct impression of the probable results, some self-consistent anticipation, the ground of the *prudens quæstio*, (the forethoughtful inquiry) which he affirms to be the prior *half* of the knowledge sought, *dimidium scientiæ*. With him, therefore, as with us, an *Idea* is an experiment proposed, an experiment is an idea realized. For so he himself informs us :—*Neque scientiam molimur tam sensu, vel instrumentis, quam experimentis ; etenim experimentorum longe major est subtilitas, quam sensus ipsius, licet instrumentis exquisitis adjuti. Nam de iis*

^{59a} Cf. Coleridge on *Logic and Learning*, pp. 65–6 and note.

⁶⁰ ¶¶ 27–30. The material of these paragraphs is used in *The Friend*, Sec. II Essay IX, ¶ 3 (1818, Essay VIII), but the order is different.

*loquimur experimentis, quæ, ad intentionem ejus quod quæritur, perite, et secundum artem excogitata et apposita sunt. Itaque perceptioni sensus immediatæ et propriæ non multum tribuimus : sed eo rem deducimus, ut sensus tantum de experimento, experimentum de re judicet.*⁶¹ The meaning of this last sentence is intelligible enough, though involved in antithesis, merely because Bacon did not possess, like Shakespeare, a good Method in his style.⁶² What he means to say is, that we can apprehend, through the organs of sense, only the sensible phænomena produced by the experiment ; but by the mental power, in virtue of which we shaped the experiment, we can determine the true *import* of the *phænomena*.

28 Now, he had before said, that he was speaking only of those experiments, which were skilfully adapted to the intention or purpose of him who conducted the research. But what is it that forms the intention, or purpose, and adapts thereto the experiment ? What Bacon calls *lux intellectus* ; viz. the Understanding of the individual man, who makes the experiment. This light, however, as he argues at great length, is obscured by *Idols*, which are false and spurious notions. His peculiar use of the word *Idols* is again a proof of faulty Method in his style, for it gives a sort of pedantic air to his reasonings ; but, in truth, he means no more by it than what Plato means by *Opinion*, (*δόξα*), which the latter calls “ a medium between knowledge and ignorance.” So, Bacon distinguishes the *Idols* of the Mind into various kinds (*Idola specus, tribus, fori, theatri,*) that is, *Opinions* derived from the passions, prejudices, and peculiar habits of each man’s Understanding : and as these *Idols*, or *Opinions*, confessedly produce a sort of mental obscurity, or blindness, so the ancient and the modern master of

⁶¹ Inexactly quoted from *Distributio Operis*, Cf. Spedding, 1857, I, 138.

⁶² *The Friend’s* comment on the use of antithesis in Bacon’s style is more characteristic of Coleridge.

Philosophy both agree in prescribing remedies and operations calculated to remove this disease ; to couch the “ Mind’s eye,” and to restore it to the enjoyment of a purer vision. Bacon establishes an unerring criterion between the Ideas and the Idols of the Mind ; namely, that the latter are empty notions, but the former are the very seals and impresses of Nature ; that is to say, they always fit and cohere with those classes of things to which they belong ; as the Idea of a circle fits and coheres with all true circles. His words are these : *Non leve quiddam interest inter humanæ Mentis Idola, et divinæ Mentis Ideas, hoc est, inter placita quædam inania, et veras signaturas atque impressiones factas in creaturis, prout ratione sanâ et sicci luminis, quam, docendi causâ interpretem Naturæ vocare consuevimus, inveniuntur.*—*Novum Organum*, xxiii. and xxvi.⁶³

29 Some Idols, says Bacon, are adventitious to the Mind ; others innate. And here, we may observe, that he goes somewhat further than the mere doctrine of innate Ideas, by holding that of innate Idols. However, we say not this in disparagement of his *system*, which is clear and correct ; nor, on the other hand, do we mean to espouse all its *parts*, which must be left to speak for themselves. What he means by innate Idols, he thus illustrates :—not only do the rays of Truth, from without, fall obliquely on the mirror of the Mind, but that mirror itself is not pure and plane ; it discolours, it magnifies, it diminishes, it distorts. Hence, he uses the words *intellectus humanus, mens hominis*, &c. in a sense now peculiar, but in his day conformable to the language of the Schools, to signify not Intellect in general, or Mind in its perfection, but the Intellect or Mind of man, weakened and corrupted, as it is, more or less, in every individual. A necessary consequence of this corruption, is the arrogance which leads Man to take the forms and

⁶³ Adapted from aphorisms cited, Bk. I.

mechanism of his own reflective faculty as the measure of Nature and of the Deity. Of all Idols, or of all Opinions, this is the most difficult to remedy or extirpate ; and therefore, in this view, the Intellect of Man is more prone to error than even his Senses. Such is the sound and incontrovertible doctrine of Bacon ; but herein he does no more than repeat what both Plato and Heraclitus had long before urged with most impressive argument. The forms of the reflective faculty are *subjective* ; the truths to be embraced are *objective* : but according to Plato, as well as to Bacon, there can be no hope of any fruitful and secure *Method*, so long as forms, merely subjective, are arbitrarily assumed to be the moulds of objective Truth, the seals and impresses of Nature.

30 What then ! Does Bacon abandon the hope of rectifying the obliquities of the Human Intellect ; or does he suggest, that they will be remedied by the casual operation of external impressions ? Neither of these. He considers that its weaknesses and imperfections require to be strengthened and made perfect by a higher power ; and that this is possible to be done. He supposes, that the Intellect of the individual, or *homme particulier*, may be refined by the Intellect of the Ideal Man, or *homme général*. He assumes, that as the evidence of the Senses is corrected by the Judgment, so the evidence of the Judgment, beset with Idols, may be corrected by the Judgment, walking in the light of Ideas. It is surely superfluous to urge, that this corrector and purifier of all reasoning, this inextinguishable Polestar—

Which never in the ocean waves was wet :

whether it be called, as by Bacon, *lumen siccum*, or as by Plato, *vous*, or *φῶς νοερὸν*, is one and the same light of *Truth*, the indispensable condition of all pure Science, con-

templative or experimental. Hence, it will not surprise us, that Plato so often denominates Ideas living *Laws*, in and by which the Mind has its whole true being and permanence ; or that Bacon, *vice versâ*, names the Laws of Nature, *Ideas* ; and represents the great leading facts of Science as signatures, impressions, and symbols of those Ideas. A distinguishable power self-affirmed, and seen in its unity with the Eternal Essence, is, according to Plato, an IDEA : and the discipline by which the Human Mind is purified from its Idols, and raised to the contemplation of Ideas, and thence to the secure and progressive investigation of truth and reality, by Scientific Method, comprehends what the same Philosopher so highly extols, under the title of *Dialectic*. According to Lord Bacon, as describing the same Truth, applied to Natural Philosophy, an Idea would be defined as—*Intuitio, sive inventio, quæ in perceptione sensus non est (ut quæ puræ et sicci luminis Intellectioni sit propria) Idearum Divinæ Mentis, prout in creaturis, per signaturas suas, sese patefaciant*. “That,” saith the judicious HOOKER, “which doth assign to each thing the kind, that which determineth the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same we term a LAW.”⁶⁴

31⁶⁵ From all that has been said, it seems clear, that the only difference between Plato and Bacon was, that, to speak in popular language, the one more especially cultivated Natural Philosophy, the other Metaphysics. Plato treated principally of Truth, as manifested in the world of Intellect ; Bacon of the same Truth, as manifested in the world of Sense ; but far from disagreeing, as to the mode of attaining that Truth, far from differing in their great views of the *education of the Mind*, they both proceeded on the same principles of *unity and progression* ; and consequently both

⁶⁴ *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk. I, Chap. II.

⁶⁵ ¶ 31. The essence of the paragraph, sentence 2, is given in a slightly different form in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay IX, ¶ 3 (1818, Essay VIII).

cultivated alike the *Science of Method*, such as we have here described it. If we are correct in these statements, then may we boast to have solved the great problem of conciliating ancient and modern Philosophy.

32⁶⁶ That the *Method*, of which we have hitherto treated, is not arbitrarily assumed in any, or all of the pursuits, to which we have adverted; nor is peculiar to these in particular, but is founded in the Laws and necessary conditions of Human existence, is further to be inferred from the general view of the History of the Human race. As in the individual, so in the whole community of Mankind, our cogitations have an infancy of aimless activity; and a youth of education and advance towards order; and an opening manhood, of high hopes and expectations; and a settled, staid, and sober middle age, of ripened and deliberate judgment.

33⁶⁷ "The antiquity of time was the youth of the world and of knowledge," said Bacon.⁶⁸ In that early age, the *obedience of the will* was first taught to Man. He was required to look up, in submission, to that Spirit of Truth, which, after all, we find to be at the head of wisdom. This innocent age was happily prolonged among those whose first care was to cultivate the Moral sense, and to seek in Faith the evidence of things not seen. To them were propounded a Spiritual Creator and a Spiritual worship, and the assured hope of a future and Spiritual existence; and therefore they were less curious to watch the motions of the stars, or to become "artificers in brass and iron," or to "handle the harp and the organ." They were less wise

⁶⁶ ¶ 32. This transition to historical considerations appears, with different emphasis and much amplified, in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay X, ¶ 4 (1818, Essay IX).

⁶⁷ ¶ 33. This part of the historical summary appears, amplified, in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay X, ¶¶ 6, 7 and 8 (1818, Essay IX).

⁶⁸ Cf. *Advancement of Learning*, Bk. I, and *Novum Organum*, Aphorisms (Bk. I) LXXXIV.

in their generation than the “mighty men of old, the men of renown;” but their Ideas were plain and distinct; they were “just and perfect men;” and they “walked with God;” whilst, of the others, “every imagination of the thoughts of the heart was only evil continually.” For the latter wilfully chose an opposite *Method*: they determined to shape their convictions and deduce their knowledge from *without*, by exclusive observation of outward things, as the only realities. Hence they became rapidly *civilized*. They built cities, and refined on the means of sensual gratification, and the conveniences of courtly intercourse. They became the great masters of the agreeable, which fraternized readily with cruelty and rapacity; these being, indeed, but alternate moods of the same sensual selfishness. Thus, both before and after the Flood, the vicious of Mankind receded from all true cultivation, as they hurried towards civilization. Finally, as it was not in their power to make themselves wholly beasts, and to remain without a semblance of Religion, and yet, as they were faithful to their original maxim,—determined to receive nothing as true, but what they derived, or believed themselves to derive, from their senses, or (in modern phrase) what they could prove *à posteriori*,—they became Idolaters of the Heavens, and of the material elements; and finally, out of the Idols of the Mind, they formed material Idols: and bowed down to stocks and stones, as to the unformed incorporeal Divinity.

34 ⁶⁹ A new era next appeared, representative of the youth and approaching manhood of the Human Intellect: and again, Providence, as it were, awakened men to the pursuit of an Idealized Method, in the development of their faculties. Orpheus, Linus, Musæus, and the other Mythological Bards, or perhaps Brotherhoods of Bards imperson-

⁶⁹ ¶ 34. This period is considered, at greater length, in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay X, ¶¶ 9 and 10 (1818, Essay IX).

ated under individual names, whether deriving their light, imperfectly and indirectly, from the inspired writings of the Hebrews, or graciously visited, for high and important purposes, by a dawning of Truth in their own breasts, began to spiritualize Polytheism, and thereby to prevent it from producing all its natural, barbarizing effects. Hence the Mysteries and Mythological Hymns ; which, on the one hand, gradually shaped themselves into Epic Poetry and History, and, on the other, into Tragedy and Philosophy : whilst to the lifeless Statuary of the Egyptians was super-added a Promethean animation ; and the Ideal in Sculpture soon extending itself to Painting and to Architecture, the Fine Arts at once shot up to perfection by a Method founded wholly on a mental initiative, and conducted throughout its progress by the development of Ideas. This rapid advance, in all things which owe their existence and character to the Mind's own acts, intellectual or imaginative, forms a singular contrast with the rude and imperfect manner in which those acts were applied to the investigation of Physical Laws and phænomena. While Phidias, Apelles, Homer, Demosthenes, Thucydides, and Plato, had, each in his individual sphere, attained almost the summit of conceivable excellence, the Natural History and the Natural Philosophy of the whole World may be said to have lain dormant ; especially if we compare them with the efforts which the Moderns made in these directions, in the very morning of their strength.

35 ⁷⁰ Of the Roman era it is scarcely necessary to speak at large, inasmuch as the Romans were confessedly mere imitators of the Greeks in everything relative ^{70a} to Science and Art. They sustained a very important part in the

⁷⁰ ¶ 35. This is recast in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay X, ¶ 11 (1818, Essay IX). *The Friend*, ¶ 12, adds a point about Christianity as the final synthesis.

^{70a} First edition reads "relating."

Civil, and Military, and Ecclesiastical History of Mankind ; and their devotion to these objects was, in their own eyes, a sufficient apology for their want of originality in what they held to be far inferior pursuits.

Excudent alii spirantia mollius æra :
Credo equidem, vivos ducent de marmore vultus :
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.⁷¹

36⁷² Still less will it be expected, that we should devote much space to the consideration of those Dark Ages, which brought the countless hordes of sensual Barbarians from their Northern forests to meet, in the Southern and middle parts of Europe, the spiritualizing influence of Christianity : but one remarkable effect of that influence we cannot suffer to pass unnoticed. We allude to the gradual abolition of domestic slavery, in virtue of a Principle essential to Christianity, by which a *person* is eternally differenced from a *thing* ; so that the *Idea* of a Human Being necessarily excludes the Idea of property in that Being.

37 We come down, then, to the great period of the REFORMATION, which, regarded as an epoch in the education of the Human Mind, was second to none for its striking and durable effects. The defenders of a simple and Spiritual worship, against one which was full of outward forms and ceremonies ; the partisans of Religious liberty, against the dominion of a Visible Head over the whole Christian Church ; and, generally speaking, the advocates of the Ideal and internal against the external or imaginative,—maintained a zealous, and in great part of Europe, a prosperous conflict. But the revolution of Thought, and its effects on the Science of Method, were soon visible beyond the pale of the Church or the Cloister : and the Schoolmen were attacked as warmly in their Philosophical, as they had

⁷¹ *Æneid*, Bk. VI, ll. 847–51, with omissions.

⁷² ¶¶ 36 and 37. The résumé of later history is not included in *The Friend*.

before been in their Ecclesiastical character. It is needless to dwell on the various attempts towards introducing into Learning a totally new Method. That of our illustrious countryman, BACON, was completely successful : and we have already shown that it was, in truth, the completion of the Ideal System, by applying the same Method to external Nature which Plato had before applied to intellectual existence.

38 ⁷³ It is only in the union of these two branches of one and the same Method that a complete and genuine Philosophy can be said to exist. To this consideration the great mind of Bacon does not seem to have been fully awake ; and hence, not only is the general scope of his Work directed almost exclusively to the contemplation of Physical Ideas, but there are occasional expressions which seem to have misled many of his followers into a belief that he considered all Wisdom and all Science both to begin and to end with the objects of the senses. In this gross error are laid the foundations of the modern French School, which has grown up into the monstrous puerilities of CONDILLAC and CONDORCET ; men whose names it would be absolutely ridiculous to mention in a History of Science, if their pupils did not unhappily compensate, in number, what their Works want in common sense and intelligibility ; and if upon such Writers, the French Nation did not mainly rest its pretensions to give the law to Europe in matters of Science and Philosophy.

⁷³ This concluding paragraph, 38, does not appear in *The Friend*, but the ideas expressed are characteristic of Coleridge. Cf., for instance, the *Theory of Life* (Ashe's *Miscellanies*), p. 401 note, and *Letters* (E. H. Coleridge), II, 448.

SECTION III

APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF METHOD TO THE GENERAL CONCATENATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF STUDIES

1¹ WE have already dwelt so much on the general importance of Method—we have recurred to it so frequently—we have placed it in so many various lights, that we ought perhaps to apologize for venturing on one more attempt to illustrate our meaning, partly in the way of simile, and partly of example. Let us, however, imagine an unlettered African, or rude, but musing Indian, poring over an illumined manuscript of the inspired volume; with the vague, yet deep impression, that his fates and fortunes are, in some unknown manner, connected with its contents. Every tint, every group of characters, has its several dream. Say that, after long and dissatisfying toils, he begins to sort, first, the paragraphs that appear to resemble each other; then the lines, the words; nay, that he has at length discovered, that the whole is formed by the recurrence and interchange of a limited number of ciphers, letters, marks, and points which, however, in the very height and utmost perfection of his attainment, he makes twenty-fold more numerous than they are, by classing every different form of the same character, intentional or accidental, as a separate element. And yet the whole is without soul or substance, a talisman of superstition, or a mockery of Science; or is employed perhaps, at last, to feather the arrows of death, or to shine and flutter amid the plumes of savage vanity. The poor Indian too truly represents the state of learned and

¹ Except for the introductory sentence the paragraph appears, practically as it stands, in *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay XI, ¶ 4 (1813, second half of ¶ 4, Essay X misprinted "IX").

systematic ignorance—arrangement guided by the light of no leading Idea ; mere orderliness without METHOD !

2² But see, the friendly missionary arrives ! He explains to him the nature of written words, translates them for him into his native sounds, and thence into the thoughts of his heart : how many of these thoughts are then first unfolded into consciousness, which yet the awakening disciple receives not as aliens ! Henceforward the book is unsealed for him ; the depth is opened ; he communes with the *spirit* of the volume, as with a living oracle. The words become transparent : he sees them, as though he saw them not ; whilst he mentally devours the meaning they contain. From that moment, his former chimerical and useless arrangement is discarded, and the results of Method are to him life and truth.

3³ If some particular studies are yet confessedly deficient in the vivifying power of Method, we much fear that the attempts to bind together the whole Body of Science have been, in certain instances, worse than immethodical. A slight glance at the particular department of Literature which we have chosen, especially as it has been filled on the Continent, from the memorable combination of Deistical talent in the *Dictionnaire Encyclopédique*, to a Work on the same principles, said to be now publishing in France,⁴ will demonstrate, that the best interests of Mankind have suffered serious injury from this cause ; that the fountains of education may be poisoned, where the stream appears to flow on with increasing power and smoothness ; and that the *insinuation* of sceptical principles into Works of Science is fraught with the greatest danger to posterity.

² ¶ 2, to "whilst he mentally devours," forms ¶ 5 of Essay XI (Sec. II) of *The Friend* (1818, Essay X misprinted "IX").

³ ¶¶ 3-5 on the relation of the *Metropolitana* to other encyclopædias etc. do not appear in *The Friend*. But see *Prospectus*, especially pp. 72-6, below.

⁴ Undoubtedly the *Encyclopédie Méthodique*.

4 To oppose an effectual barrier to the rage for desultory knowledge, on the one hand, and to support that body of independent attachment to the best principles of *all* knowledge, which happily distinguishes this country, on the other, the *ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA* has been projected.

5 We do not undertake, what the most gigantic efforts of Man could not achieve, a *Universal Dictionary of Knowledge*, in the most absolute sense of the terms. But estimating the importance of our task rather by the principles of *unity* and *compression* than by those of variety and extent, we have laboured to build upon what is essential that which is obviously useful, and upon both whatever is elegant or agreeable in Science ; and this, we conceive, cannot be well and usefully effected, but by such a Philosophical Method as we have already indicated.

6⁵ We have shown that this METHOD consists in placing one or more *particular* things or notions, in subordination, either to a preconceived *universal* Idea, or to some lower form of the latter ; some class, order, genus, or species, each of which derives its intellectual significancy, and scientific worth, from being an ascending step toward the universal ; from being its representative, or temporary substitute. Without this master-thought, therefore, there can be no true Method ; and according as the general conception more or less clearly manifests itself throughout all the particulars, as their connective and bond of unity : according as the light of the Idea is freely diffused through, and completely illumines, the aggregate mass, the Method is more or less perfect.

7⁶ The first preconception, or master-thought, on which

⁵ ¶ 6. This summary does not appear in *The Friend*.

⁶ ¶ 7. The idea of the moral origin and tendency of all true science is expressed in *The Friend* in the concluding paragraphs of the essays on method, Sec. II Essay XI, ¶¶ 18-19 (1818, Essay X misprinted "IX," 17-18 Bohn, XI, 17-18)

our plan rests, is the *moral origin and tendency* of all true Science ; in other words, our great objects are to exhibit the Arts and Sciences in their Philosophical harmony ; to teach Philosophy in union with Morals ; and to sustain Morality by Revealed Religion.

8⁷ There are, as we have before noticed, two sorts of relation, on the due observation of which all Method depends. The first is that which the Ideas or Laws of the Mind bear to each other ; the second, that which they bear to the external world ; on the former are built the Pure Sciences ; on the latter those which we call Mixed and Applied.

9⁸ The *Pure Sciences*, then, represent pure acts of the Mind, and those only ; whether employed in contemplating the *forms* under which things in their first elements are necessarily viewed and treated by the Mind, or in contemplating the substantial *reality* of those things.

10 Hence, in the Pure Sciences, arises the known distinction of *formal* and *real* : and of the first, some teach the elementary forms, which the Mind necessarily adopts in the processes of reasoning ; and others, those under which alone all particular objects can be grasped and considered by the Mind ; either as distinguishable in quantity and number, or as occupying parts of space. The *real* Sciences, on the other hand, are conversant with the true nature and existence, either of the created Universe around us, or of the guiding Principles within us, in their various modifications and distinguishing movements ; or, lastly, with the real nature and existence of the great Cause of all.

11 We begin, then, with that class of Pure Sciences which

⁷ This recapitulation is not included in *The Friend*.

⁸ ¶¶ 9-27. None of this résumé of the general scheme of the *Metropolitana* appears in *The Friend*, though the principles enunciated were in general laid down in *The Friend* as in the earlier portions of this version. On the principles of classification see above, pp. xvii. ff. See also Table facing p. 71.

we have called *formal*; and of these, the first two that present themselves to us are *Grammar* and *Logic*. By *Grammar* we are taught the rules of that speech which serves as the medium of Mental intercourse between man and man; by *Logic*, the Mental operations are themselves regulated and bound together in a certain Method or order. As the communication of knowledge is the more immediate object of our present discussion, so we begin with that Science by which it is regulated in its forms. Grammar, then, apart from the mere material consideration of the sound of words, or shape of letters, and regarding speech only as a thing significant, teaches that there are certain laws regulating that signification; laws which are immutable in their very nature; for the relation which a noun bore to a verb, or a substantive to an adjective, was the same in the earliest days μέροπων ἀνθρωπων, in the first intelligible conversations of men, as it is now; nor can it ever vary so long as the powers of Thought remain the same in the Human Mind. This, then, is a Pure Science proceeding from a simple or elementary Idea of the form necessary for the conveyance of a single thought, and thence spreading and diffusing itself over all the relations of significant Language.

12 Grammar brings us, naturally, to the Science of *Logic*, or the knowledge of those forms which the conceptions of the Mind assume in the processes of reasoning. And it is manifest that this Science is no less subject than the former to fixed laws; for the reasoning power in Man can operate only ^{8a} within those limits which Almighty Wisdom has thought fit to prescribe. It is a discursive faculty, moving in a given path, and by allotted means. There is no possibility of subverting or altering the elementary rules of Logic; for they are not hypothetical or contingent, or conventional, but positive and necessary.

^{8a} First edition reads "only operate."

13 Under the general term *Mathematics* are comprised the Sciences of *Geometry*, which is conversant about the laws of figure, or limitations of space ; and *Arithmetic*, which concerns the laws of number. Now these laws are purely Ideal. It is not externally to us that the general notion of a square, or a triangle, of the number three, or the number five, exists ; nor do we seek for external proof of the relations of those notions ; but on the contrary, by contemplating them as Ideas in the Mind, we discover truths which are applicable to external existence.

14 The Sciences which we have hitherto noticed relate to the forms of our Mental conceptions ; but it is natural for Man to seek to comprehend the principles and conditions of real existence, both with regard to the Universe in general, with regard to his own internal mover, or conscience, and, above all, with regard to the cause by which conscience and the whole Universe were called into being, and continue to exist, namely, GOD. Hence, as we advance from form to reality, the Sciences of *Metaphysics* and *Morals* first present themselves to view, and these lead us forward to the summit of Human Knowledge ; for at the head of all Pure Science stands *Theology*, of which the great fountain is Revelation. It is obvious that both Metaphysics and Morals are conversant solely about those relations which we have called Relations of Law ; for it would be a contradiction to say, that a real existence could be, at the same time, a mere theory or hypothesis. These Sciences have, therefore, all the purity and all the certainty which belong to that which is positive and absolute ; and as far as they are distinctly apprehended by the Mind, they approach the nearest to that clear intellectual light which, in the peculiar phraseology of Lord Bacon, is called *lumen siccum*. In the proper Philosophical Method, the reality of our speculative knowledge, exhibited in the Science of Metaphysics, unites

itself at last with the reality of our Ethical sentiments displayed in that of Morals ; and both together are at once lost and consummated in Theology, which rises above the light of Reason to that of Faith.

15 These are all the Sciences which embrace solely relations of Law : and it is plain that in these, not only the initiative, but every subsequent step, must be an act of the Mind alone. But when we descend to the second order of relations, namely, those which we bear to the external world, Theory is immediately introduced ; new Sciences are formed, which, in contradistinction from the *Pure*, are called the *Mixed* and *Applied* Sciences ; and in these, new considerations relative to Method necessarily find a place.

16 Every Physical Theory is in some measure imperfect, because it is of necessity progressive ; and because we can never be assured that we have exhausted the terms, or that some new discovery may not affect the whole scheme of its relations.⁹ The discoveries of the ponderability of air, of its compound nature, of the increased weight of the calces, of the gases in general, of Electricity, and more recently the stupendous influences of Galvanism on the successive Chemical Theories ; are all so many exemplifications of this truth. The doctrines of vortices, of an universal ether, of a two-fold magnetic fluid, &c., are *Theories* of Gravitation : but the Science of Astronomy is founded on the *Law* of Gravitation, and remains unaffected by the rise and fall of the Theories. In the lowest condition of Method, the initiative is supplied by an *hypothesis* ; of which we may distinguish two degrees. In the former, a fact of actual experience is taken, and placed experimentally as the common support of certain other facts, as equally present in all : thus, that oxygen is a principle of acidification and

⁹ Cf. *The Friend*, Sec. II, Essay VII, ¶ 3 (1818, Essay VI) ; and especially letter of 1801 to Davy, *Biographia Epistolaris*, I, 245.

combustion is an experienced fact, and became a hypothesis by the assumption that it is the *sole* principle of acidification and combustion. In the latter, a fact is imagined : as, for instance, an atom or physical point, preternaturally hard, and therefore infrangible, in the Corpuscular Philosophy ; or a primitive unalterable figure, in some systems of Crystallisation.

17 In all this we see, that Knowledge is a matter not of necessary connection, but of a connection arising from observation or supposition ; that is, it consists not of Law, but of Theory or Hypothesis. True Theory is always in the first and purest sense a *locum tenens* of Law ; when it is not, it degenerates into hypothesis, and hypothesis melts away into conjecture. Both in Law and in Theory there must be a mental antecedent ; but in the latter, it may be an image or conception received through the senses, and originating from without ; yet even then there is an inspiring passion, or desire, or instinctive feeling of the truth, which is the immediate and proper offspring of the Mind. Now, we may consider the facts which are to be reduced to Theory, as arranged over the whole surface of a plane circle. If, by carrying the power of Theory to a near identity with Law, we find the centre of the circle, then, proceeding toward the circumference, our insight into the whole may be enlarged by new discoveries ; it never can be wholly changed. A magnificent example of this has been realized in the Science of Astronomy ; a recent addition of facts has been effected by the discovery of other Planets, and our views have been rendered more distinct by the solution of the apparent irregularities of the Moon's motion, and their subsumption under the general Law of Gravitation. But the Newtonian was not less a system before than since the discovery of the Georgium Sidus ; not by having ascertained its circumference, but by having found its centre

the living and salient point, from which the Method of discovery diverges, the Law in which endless discoveries are contained implicitly, and to which, as they afterwards arise, they may be referred in endless succession.

18 These reasonings, it is hoped, will sufficiently explain the nature of the transition from the *Pure Sciences* to the *Mixed and Applied Sciences*, and will serve to trace the inseparable connection of the latter with the constitution of the Human Mind. And as each of these great divisions of Knowledge has its own department in the grand Moral Science of Man, it is obvious that a scheme, which, like our own, not only contains each separately, but combines both as indivisible, the one from the other, must present, in the most advantageous point of view, whatever is useful and beautiful in either. In speaking of the Mixed and Applied Sciences we must be permitted, however, to remark that the word Science is evidently used in a looser and more popular form than when we denominate Mathematics, or Metaphysics, a Science ; for we know not, for instance, the truth of any general result of observation in Nosology, as we know that two and two make four, or that a Human person cannot be identical with another Human person. And, in like manner, when the word Law is used with relation to the Mixed and Applied Sciences, as when we speak of any supposed Law of Vegetation, we use a more popular language than when we speak of a Law of the Conscience, which is not to be prevaricated. The strictness of ancient Philosophy, therefore, refused the name of Science to these pursuits ; and it might at least be convenient, if in speaking generally of the Pure, the Mixed, and the Applied Sciences, we gave them the common name of Studies, inasmuch as we study them all alike, but we do not know them all with the same sort of knowledge.

19 Of these, then (be they Studies or Sciences) we call

those *Mixed*, in which certain Ideas of the Mind are applied to the general properties of bodies, solid, fluid, and aerial ; to the power of vision, and to the arrangement of the Universe ; whence we obtain the Sciences of *Mechanics*, *Hydrostatics*, *Pneumatics*, *Optics*, and *Astronomy*. It is matter, not of certain Science, but of observation, that such properties do really exist in bodies, that vision is effected in such or such a manner, and that the Universe is disposed in this or that relative position, and subjected to certain movements of its parts. Therefore, these Sciences may vary, and notoriously have varied ; and though Kepler would demonstrate that Euclid *Copernicised*, or had some knowledge of the System afterwards adopted by Copernicus ; yet of this there is little proof : and certainly, for many ages after Euclid, it was the universal opinion, that the Earth was the fixed and immoveable centre of the Universe. Nor have we here unadvisedly used the word *opinion* ; since, as we before showed, it is the ancient expression signifying a medium between Knowledge and Ignorance : and well did that acute Italian exclaim, *Opinione, regina del mondo !*—for, as it is impossible that Ignorance, which cannot govern itself, should govern anything else, so to expect that all the world should be wise enough to submit to the government of Wisdom, would be to show that we had followed very little Method in our study either of History, of living men, or even of ourselves.

20 When certain Ideas, or images representative of Ideas, are applied still more particularly, not to the investigation of the general and permanent properties of all bodies, but of certain changes in those properties, or of properties existing in bodies partially, then we popularly call the Studies relative to such matters by the name of *Applied Sciences* ; such are *Magnetism*, *Electricity*, *Galvanism*, *Chemistry*, the Laws of *Light* and *Heat*, &c. We have already so fully shown the

uncertainty of the first Principles in these Studies, and have so distinctly traced the cause of that uncertainty, in every case, to a want of clearness in the first Idea or Mental initiative of the Science, that it will be unnecessary here to do more than refer to our preceding observations.

21 We come now to another class of Applied Sciences, namely, those which are applied to the purposes of pleasure through the medium of the Imagination; and which are commonly called the FINE ARTS.¹⁰ These are *Poetry, Painting, Music, Sculpture, Architecture*. We have before said, that the Method to be observed in these, holds a sort of middle place between the Method of Law, or Pure Science, and the Method of Theory. In regard to the Mixed Sciences, and to the first class of Applied Sciences, the Mental initiative may have been received from without; but it has escaped some Critics, that in the Fine Arts the Mental initiative must necessarily proceed from within. Hence we find them giving, as it were, recipes to form a Poet, by placing him in certain directions and positions; as if they thought that every deer-stealer might, if he pleased, become a Shakspeare, or that Shakspeare's mind was made up of the shreds and patches of the books of his day, which by good fortune he happened to read in such an order that they successively fitted into the scenes of *Macbeth, Othello, The Tempest, As you like it, &c.* Certainly the Fine Arts belong to the outward world, for they all operate by the images of sight and sound, and other sensible impressions; and without a delicate tact for these, no man ever was, or could be, either a Musician or a Poet; nor could he attain to excellence in any one of these Arts; but as certainly he must always be a poor and unsuccessful cultivator of the Arts if he is not impelled first by a mighty, inward

¹⁰ See above, pp. xxi-xxii, for Coleridge's objection to the position assigned the Fine Arts.

power, a feeling, *quod nequeo monstrare, et sentio tantum* ; nor can he make great advances in his Art, if, in the course of his progress, the obscure impulse does not gradually become a bright, and clear, and living Idea !

22 Pursuits of utility, we daily find are capable of being reduced to Method. Thus *Political Economy*, and *Agriculture*, and *Commerce*, and *Manufactures*, are now considered scientifically, or, as the more prevalent expression is, Philosophically. It may, perhaps, be difficult, at first, to persuade the experimental Agriculturist that he also pursues, or ought to pursue, an Ideal Method ; nor do we mean by this that he must deal only in ideal sheep and oxen, and in the groves and meads of Fairy Land. But these Studies, soberly considered, will be found wholly dependent on the Sciences of which we have already stated.^{10a} It is not, surely, in the Country of ARKWRIGHT, that the Philosophy of Commerce can be thought independent of Mechanics : and where DAVY has delivered Lectures on Agriculture, it would be folly to say that the most Philosophic views of Chemistry were not conducive to the making our valleys laugh with corn.

23 We have already spoken of LINNÆUS, the illustrious Swede, to whom the three *kingdoms*, as they are aptly called, of *Natural History* are so deeply indebted ; and if, with all his great talents, he yet failed in establishing the united empire of those three mighty monarchies on firm laws and a fixed constitution, we have shown, that it was only owing to a want of precision in the first Ideas of his theory.

24 Natural History itself becomes a rule for dependent pursuits, such as those of *Medicine* (under which are *Pharmacy* and the *Materia Medica*) and *Surgery*, in which is included *Anatomy*. That in these and the other theoretical studies so much still remains to be done, ought not to be a

^{10a} First edition reads "treated."

subject for regret, but, on the contrary, for a laudable and generous ambition. Yet that ambition should be regulated and moderated by a due consideration of the place which the particular pursuit in question holds in the great circle of the Sciences, and by observing the only proper *Method* which can be pursued for its improvement. If, in what we have here said, we have done anything towards the excitement, the regulation, and the assistance of that ambition ; if we have faintly sketched an outline of the great laws of Method, which bind together the various branches of Human Knowledge, we may not improperly indulge a hope that the ensuing Work, in its progress, will be found conducive to the promotion of the best interests of Mankind.

25 Our Plan would not completely meet the views of those to whom such Works as the following are eminently useful and agreeable, if, besides the Philosophic Method, already described, we did not present some view of the actual History of Mankind. We have therefore devoted a large portion of our labours to the History of the Human Race, on a new, and, we trust it will be found, an improved System. Biography and History tend to the same points of general instruction, in two ways : the one exhibiting Human Principles and Passions, acting upon a large scale ; the other showing them as they move in a smaller circle, but enabling us to trace the orbit which they describe with greater precision. The one brings Man into contact with Society, actuated by the interests which agitate and stimulate him in the various social combinations of his existence ; and Human Nature presents itself in the varied shapes impressed upon it by the different ranks which it occupies. The other brings before us the individual when he stands alone, his passions asleep, his native impulses under no external excitement ; in the undress of one who has retired from the stage, on which he felt he had a part to sustain ;

and even the Monarch, forgetting the pomp and circumstance of his royalty, remembers here only that he is a Man. Assuredly the great use of History is to acquaint us with the Nature of Man. This end is best answered by the most faithful portrait ; but Biography is a collection of portraits. At the same time there must be some mode of grouping and connecting the individuals, who are themselves the great landmarks in the Map of Human Nature. It has therefore occurred to us, that the most effectual mode of attaining the chief objects of Historical knowledge will be occasionally ^{10b} to present History in the form of Biography, chronologically arranged. This will be preceded by a general Introduction on the Uses of History, and on the line which separates its early Facts from Fable ; and it will, in the course of its progress, be interspersed with connecting Chapters on the events of large and distinguishing periods of time as well as on Political Geography and Chronology. Thus will a large portion of History be conveyed, not only in its most interesting, but in its most philosophical and real form ; while the remaining facts will be interwoven in the preliminary and connecting Chapters. If in tracing thus the "eventful History" of Man, and particularly of our own Country, we should perceive, as we must necessarily do in all that is human, evils and imperfections, these will not be without their uses, in leading us back to the importance of intellectual Method as their grand and sovereign remedy. Hence shall we learn its proper national application, namely, the *education of the Mind*, first in the Man and Citizen, and then, inclusively, in the State itself.

26 Such are our views in the Philosophical and Historical branches of our Work. Of the Miscellaneous or Alphabetical Division we have little to add. But well aware that Works of this nature are not solely useful to those who have

^{10b} First edition omits "occasionally."

leisure and inclination to study Science in its comprehensiveness and unity, but are also valuable for daily reference on particular points, suggested by the desires or business of the individual, we could not hold ourselves dispensed from consulting the convenience of a numerous and most respectable class of Readers, while the preceding remarks will go to prove that, for many local and supplementary illustrations of Science, no other depository could be furnished.

27 As the Philosophical arrangement is, however, most conducive to the purposes of intellectual research and information ; as it will most naturally interest men of Science and Literature ; will present the circle of Knowledge in its harmony ; will give that unity of design and of elucidation, the want of which we have most deeply felt in other Works of a similar kind, where the desired information is divided into innumerable fragments scattered over many volumes, like a mirror broken on the ground, presenting, instead of one, a thousand images, but none entire,—this Division must, of necessity, have that prominence in the prosecution of our design which our conviction of its importance to the due execution of the plan demands : and every other part of the arrangement must be considered as subordinate to this principal organization. With respect to the whole Work, it should be observed, that in what concerns *references* we are guided by principle, not by caprice ; nor do we ever recur to them as our only means of escape from an exigency. Throughout the *ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA*, the Philosophical arrangement predominates and regulates the Alphabetical arrangement ; and the references, whether to it or from it, are auxiliary. We never refer from the first and second Divisions to the fourth, or from the first to the second, for the explanation of a term, the establishment of a Principle, or the demonstration of a

Proposition. The reference, whenever it occurs, unless it be *retrospective*, is not for the purpose of essential information, but for that which is collateral and subordinate. The theory of the *Balance*, for example, is given where it ought to be in the Treatise on Mechanics ; but they who wish to acquaint themselves with the various constructions of Balances for the purposes of Commerce or Philosophy, knowing that these cannot be introduced into a Scientific Treatise without destroying the symmetry of its parts by a suspension of the Logical order, will naturally turn, whether there be a reference or not, to the Alphabetical Department of the Work. So again, the Principles of the *Telescope* are given in the Treatise on Optics ; the varieties of construction in the Alphabetical Department ; the Principles of the *Thermometer*, when treating of the effects of Heat ; its varieties of construction in the Alphabetical Department. Practical detail, and niceties, or peculiarities of construction, can seldom be interwoven with propriety among the regular deductions of a Methodical Treatise : in all cases where they cannot, our general Principle, as it comprehends proportion, accuracy, utility, and convenience, demands a reference, whether expressed or not, to the appropriate place for all that is subservient ; that is, to the fourth or Alphabetical Division.

28¹¹ This final Division of our Work will bring the whole into unison with the two great impulses of Modern times, Trade and Literature. These, after the dismemberment of the Roman Empire, gradually reduced the conquerors and the conquered at once into several nations and a common Christendom. The natural Law of increase, and the instincts of Family, may produce Tribes, and, under rare

¹¹ ¶ 28. The idea of this paragraph, though not applied to the *Metropolitana*, constitutes the substance of Essay XI (Sec. II), ¶¶ 1 and 2 (1818, Essay X misprinted "IX" in *The Friend*).

and peculiar circumstances, Settlements and Neighbourhoods ; and Conquests may form Empires. But without Trade and Literature combined, there can be no Nation ; without Commerce and Science, no bond of Nations. As the one has for its object the wants of the body, real or artificial, the desires for which are for the greater part excited from without, so the other has for its origin, as well as for its object, the wants of the Mind, the gratification of which is a natural and necessary condition of *its* growth and sanity. In the pursuits of Commerce, the Man is called into action from without, in order to appropriate the outward world, as far as he can bring it within his reach, to the purposes of his corporeal nature. In his Scientific and Literary character he is internally excited to various studies and pursuits, the groundwork of which is in himself.

29¹² This, again, will conduct us to the distinguishing object of the present undertaking, in endeavouring to explain which we have dwelt long upon General Principles ; but not too long, if we have established the necessity of what we conceive to be the main characteristic of every just arrangement of Knowledge.

30 Our Method embraces the twofold distinction of Human activity to which we have adverted—the two great directions of Man and Society, with their several objects and ends. Without advocating the exploded doctrine of *perfectibility*, we cannot but regard all that is Human in Human Nature, and all that in Nature is above herself, as together working forward that far deeper and more permanent revolution in the Moral World of which the recent changes in the Political World may be regarded as the pioneering whirlwind and storm. But woe to that revolution which is not guided by the historic sense ; by the pure

¹² ¶¶ 29 and 30 do not appear in *The Friend*.

and unsophisticated knowledge of the past ; and to convey this Methodically, so as to aid the progress of the future, has been already announced as the distinguishing claim of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA.

January, 1818.

PROPOSED TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE *ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA*

(As published in the First Edition)

FIRST DIVISION

PURE
SCIENCES
2 Vols.

Formal

Universal Grammar and Philology : or the forms of Languages.
Logic, particular and universal : or the forms of Conceptions and their combinations.
Mathematics : (Geometry, Arithmetic, Algebra, &c.), or the forms and constructions of Figure and Number.

Real

Metaphysics : or the universal principles and conditions of Experience, having for its object the Reality of our speculative knowledge in general.
Morals : or the principles and conditions of the coincidence of the individual will with the universal reason, having for its object the Reality of our practical knowledge : (hence, in a lower stage, Politics and Human Law).
Theology : or the union of both in their application to God, the Supreme Reality.

SECOND DIVISION

MIXED AND
APPLIED
SCIENCES
6 Vols.

Mixed

Mechanics.
Hydrostatics.
Pneumatics.
Optics.
Astronomy.

Applied

I
Experimental
Philosophy

Magnetism.
Electricity including Galvanism.
Chemistry.
Light.
Heat.
Colour.
Meteorology.

II
The Fine Arts

Poetry, introduced by Psychology.
Painting.
Music.
Sculpture.
Architecture.

III
The Useful Arts

Agriculture, introduced by Political Economy.
Commerce.
Manufacture.

IV
Natural History

Introduced by Physiology in its widest sense.
Inanimate :—Chrystallography, Geology, Mineralogy.
Insentient :—Phytonomy, Botany.
Animate :—Zoology.

V
Application of
Natural History

Anatomy.
Surgery.
Materia Medica.
Pharmacy.
Medicine.

THIRD DIVISION

BIOGRAPHICAL
AND
HISTORICAL
8 Vols.

Biography CHRONOLOGICALLY arranged, interspersed with introductory Chapters of National History, Political Geography and Chronology, and accompanied with correspondent Maps and Charts.

FOURTH DIVISION

MISCELLANEOUS
AND
LEXICOGRAPHICAL
8 Vols.

Alphabetical, Miscellaneous, and Supplementary :—containing a GAZETTEER or complete Vocabulary of Geography : and a Philosophical and Etymological LEXICON of the English Language, or the History of English Words :—the citations arranged according to the Age of the Works from which they are selected, yet with every attention to the independent beauty or value of the sentences chosen which is consistent with the higher ends of a clear insight into the original and acquired meaning of every word.

The INDEX.—Being a digested and complete Body of Reference to the whole Work ; in which the known English name, as well as the scientific name, of every subject of Natural History, will be found in its alphabetical place.

APPENDIX

THE PROSPECTUS OF THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA

[The original *Prospectus* of the *Encyclopædia* was, according to the preface of the first edition (1818-45, Vol. I, p. v.), written by Coleridge and Dr. Stoddart (Sir John Stoddart, 1773-1856). Unfortunately no copy of this *Prospectus* can be found. Even Coleridge's bibliographer Mr. Thomas J. Wise tells me that he never saw a copy of it. But there is good reason to think that the thirteen paragraphs printed below, which open the rare *Prospectus* of the 1849 cabinet edition, are taken almost bodily from the original document. My grounds for this statement are not simply the internal evidence of the paragraphs themselves, nor the statement that follows them (§ 14) in the later *Prospectus* ("Having explained the *Principles* on which the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* was founded, we proceed to state a few facts, in reference to the manner in which the FIRST EDITION of the work was executed, and the *Modifications* now intended to be made in the *Second Edition*."). More telling evidence is afforded by two quotations from the first *Prospectus*, labelled as such, which duplicate word for word, with one exception to be noted, portions of the thirteen paragraphs under consideration. The preface of the first edition of the *Encyclopædia*, cited above, contained the following passage :

" 'With the Ancients,' it was remarked in the *Prospectus*, 'the term ENCYCLOPÆDIA explained itself. It was really *Instruction in a Cycle*, i.e., the cycle of the seven liberal Arts and Sciences that constituted the course of

education for the higher class of citizens ; grammar being the first, and each of the others having its particular place in the cycle determined by its dependency on the preceding.' " (Preface, p. v. See below, ¶ 2 ; "grammar . . . preceding" is omitted.) And a review of the *Encyclopædia*, published in the *Monthly Review*, June, 1819, criticizing the *Prospectus* for being rather too hard on other encyclopædias, quoted from it a passage that is duplicated *verbatim* below in ¶ 2, from "it may safely be asserted" to the end of the paragraph. It seems highly probable, therefore, that these thirteen paragraphs give a considerable portion of the original *Prospectus* practically as it was first printed.]

1. AN ENCYCLOPÆDIA is indispensable to every library, as a *concentration* of human knowledge ; while to the voyager, the naval and military officer, the colonist, and that numerous class of enterprising Britons whose want of a settled residence may isolate them from the world of letters, it is the only possible *substitute* for all other books. Works of this description are therefore among those few literary projects which have uniformly secured the patronage of the public. The reason is obvious : an Encyclopædia is to the rising education of the country at once a reservoir and a fountain—it receives perpetual accessions of knowledge from the genius of the age, which it yields again in willing abundance to posterity.

2. With the ancients, the term Encyclopædia explained itself. It was really *Instruction in a cycle*, i.e. the cycle of the seven liberal Arts and Sciences, that constituted the course of education for the higher class of citizens. Unfortunately, the inapplicability of a strictly *scientific* method to a modern Encyclopædia, such as shall include the whole of its contents, has led to the abandonment of all principle of *rational* arrangement ; and it may be safely asserted of all

our universal dictionaries hitherto, that the chief difference between them, in respect of their *plan*, consists in the more or less complete disorganization of the Sciences and Systematic Arts ; now retaining certain integral portions of the system as integers, forming each an entire treatise, but resigning these treatises to the places severally assigned to them by the accident of their initial letters ; and now splintering all alike into their fractional parts, with an arrangement merely alphabetical. Nor has the imperfection rested here. This very alphabetical position was but too frequently determined by the caprice or convenience of the compiler ; inasmuch as the division of parts into minor parts had no settled limit. Thus, one technical or scientific term included as its subordinates, and to be explained in the same article, sometimes more, sometimes fewer, other terms : and the arrangement became neither properly scientific, nor properly alphabetical. It had the inconveniences of both, without the advantages of either.

3. The results are such as might have been expected, in part from the necessity of such plans, and in part from the interference of individual whim, carelessness and procrastination, to which it afforded the amplest opportunities, and even frequent temptation. Numerous articles of important information are found where the reader could have least expected to find them ; while articles of equal interest are in many cases not to be found at all.

4. A second result is, that an Universal Dictionary so constructed, equally with an Encyclopædia the most methodically arranged, requires alphabetical references ; but with the two-fold inconvenience, from which the latter would be free. First, the references, instead of being collected in one appropriate index, or at least in some known portion of the work, are scattered throughout the whole ; and this is no slight annoyance, when a scientific term

happens to have many synonyms, as, for instance, Azote, Nitrogen, Phlogisticated Air, &c. Secondly, the references must eventually lead the reader through as many volumes, as those other words happen to be placed in, which are necessary to be *previously* understood in order to a tolerable comprehension of the term first sought.

5. A third evil, resulting from the same causes, is the utter want of all proportion in the space occupied by each article, relatively either to the importance of the particular subject, or to the promised limits of the whole work. Hence, too, it arises that the proprietors are frequently reduced to a choice of evils. The work must be extended far beyond the first expectation of the purchasers, or the articles assigned to the latter volumes must be crowded in scanty and superficial abridgments. They contract to give the public an Universal Dictionary of the Arts and Sciences, but the execution outgrows the plan. Either openly then, or in the form of supplementary volumes (bearing perhaps a large proportion to the whole work), this pledge must be redeemed. In both cases the disorder and dislocation, and in many instances the deficiencies, remain unremedied.

6. The fourth ill consequence of this arbitrary arrangement calls for a somewhat fuller consideration. It requires but a moment's reflection to be convinced, that the most voluminous Encyclopædia which has yet appeared, is incomparably too narrow to contain an Universal History of Knowledge in its present state; and that the authors and compilers will have satisfied all rational expectations if only nothing shall be found excluded from any other cause than the higher importance of that which has been admitted; in order that on *all* subjects the ends of *general* information at *least* may be accomplished. Where, therefore, selection is so imperiously required, there must be

an equal necessity that certain fixed and intelligible principles should be pre-established. An Encyclopædia neither is, nor can reasonably be considered as, the book which a man of profound science is likely to consult for those things in which he is himself eminent. He will seek for accessions to his knowledge in the works of contemporaries employed like himself in extending the pomœria of science, and will often be most interested in *speculations*, the worth and stability of which are yet undetermined. But an Encyclopædia is a *History* of human knowledge, in which therefore these intellectual embryos, which at best are (as it were) but truths in the *future* tense, have no rightful or befitting place. This, indeed, we hold to be a principle of such paramount importance, that we take the earliest opportunity of avowing our determination of a strict and systematic adherence to it; and we here give our public pledge that the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA shall be so far *historical* in all respects, that only what has been *established*, or is at least already *publici juris*, and to be found in the records of Science and Literature, shall form the main body of every article; and that any opinions or speculations of the writer himself shall be declared to be such, and be given distinctly as a mere appendix of the article to which they belong.

7. We shall now particularize the evil to which we have been referring. From the licence which the planless plan of former works allows to the separate writers—in one place, instead of a systematic history of the received truths and established discoveries in the department of knowledge, which was to have been exhibited, the larger portion of the space is filled up with the individual writer's own crude conceptions and prolix argumentation—while in another, on some subject of the highest interest, lo! in tarnished fragments over the numerous volumes, an old

work torn asunder by all the letters of the alphabet ! and reminding the classical reader of the decrepit Pelias, whose credulous daughters were induced by the artifices of Medea to cut his aged limbs in pieces, as the sole and certain means of restoring him, like another Æson, to the blooming honours of youth.

8. The SCHEME which we propose to substitute, or the principal outlines of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA, we now lay before the reader, as follows :—The work will consist of four main divisions. The first, which for the sake of distinction we have called the Philosophical part, comprises the Pure Sciences ; and the second, or Scientific part, the Mixed and Applied Sciences. The third, or Biographical part, is devoted to Biography chronologically arranged, History, Chronology, and Geography ; and the concluding or Miscellaneous part, besides being referential and supplementary to the preceding volumes, will have the unique advantage of presenting to the public, for the first time, a Philosophical and Etymological Lexicon of the English language ; the citations selected and arranged chronologically, yet including all the purposes of a common Dictionary. The volume of Index will complete this division. It will be instantly seen that the first two divisions of a work, thus arranged, will grow naturally out of each other ; the needful references will therefore be generally *retrospective*, and rarely made to future volumes. In our Biographical department we shall teach the same truths by example, that have been evolved in the former divisions, and stimulate to the exertions that have developed them ;—while in our Miscellaneous portion or in the Index, every word will be found in its usual alphabetical place, as in any other Dictionary, with a plain reference to the volume and page containing its full explanation in the present work ; together with a variety of interesting

articles, either illustrative of the former divisions, or in their own nature miscellaneous. Each division of the work will be separately paged.

9. Such is the general outline of the proposed Scheme. The Table at page 13 [see above, facing p. 71] places the principal subdivisions, likewise, before the reader's eye, with as much detail as is compatible with the limits, or requisite for the purposes, of a Prospectus. It will be seen, too, that a more particularized and systematic justification of the principles, on which the Scheme has been constructed, will be afforded in the Preliminary Treatise, or General Introduction to the Encyclopædia.

10. When the work is completed, it will appear as an orderly Digest of all the great points of human knowledge, and, notwithstanding its comparatively moderate extent and price, must form the most perfect system of intellectual instruction and entertainment, that has been hitherto submitted to the friends and patrons of Art, Science, History, and general Literature in Great Britain.

11. We would place our claims to the favourable attention and patronage of the public, on two grounds: 1. That the great outline of our plan is free from the numerous defects and inconveniences *involved* in the plan of all preceding works of the kind, or occasioned or permitted by it. 2. That the plan now substituted possesses great *positive* advantages, peculiar to itself.

12. From what has already been seen of our plan, in the necessary discussion of its relative merits, we presume that we appropriate to the work the title of an Encyclopædia by an especial right, and that of a Philosophical System on a plea of superior propriety. But we cannot neglect the argument for such a work as the present, which is derivable from the peculiar circumstances of our times. The political changes of the world have not been more wonderful than

the scientific and moral revolutions that have occurred within the last few years. The new views, new discoveries, and fresh facts, especially in all the different branches of Experimental Philosophy, which every year has brought with it, are unparalleled in the history of human knowledge ; and the accessions have not seldom been of such a nature as no mere supplementary postscript can embrace. For in many instances they affect the whole theory and consequent arrangement of the Art or Science to which they belong. Our project is in this respect therefore singularly fortunate in point of time. It will have to collect and combine the rich but scattered elements of future Science ; while a still more important argument for our plan and for the period of its execution, will be found in the manifest tendency of all the Arts and Sciences at present, from the most purely intellectual even to the labours of the common mechanic, to lose their former insulated character, and organize themselves into one harmonious body of knowledge. The civilized world is now doing that which the *ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA* is preparing to do ; and for which it is providing a correspondent repository.

13. The Proprietors have not disguised from themselves that their undertaking is of the most *arduous* kind. The mass of ability requisite, will be great in proportion to the originality of our plan ; and the perseverance, harmony, and punctuality, that are indispensable conditions of its success, must be commensurate with the difficulty of uniting variety with system, and of reconciling selectness and calculated proportion with universality as a whole, and fulness in each component part. If, in addition to this, the amount of capital demanded and already dedicated to the one purpose of securing this coalition, and of overcoming these difficulties, be considered ; with the number and high

character of the artists, men of science, and men of letters, on whose zealous co-operation, now pledged to us, we rest our pretension to the first acts of the public favour, and our confident hopes of continued support—not forgetting the relief and moral influence of a regular employment afforded during all seasons of the year to so many industrious mechanics as must necessarily be engaged on this work—the Proprietors of the *ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA* dare promise themselves, that by no reflecting reader will the present prospectus be deemed too serious.

AUTOGRAPH FRAGMENTS RELATING TO METHOD

(From British Museum MS Egerton 2800)

I. On Zoology and Physiology, f. 78 r.

Folio 78 *recto* contains a full page of MS in Coleridge's own hand, with several deletions and corrections. It is clearly some draft of the passage in *The Friend* beginning "[that Zoology] soon after the commencement" and continuing through the paragraph, including the foot-note (Sec. II, Essay VII, ¶ 2; 1818, Essay VI); and of the corresponding passage in the *Treatise on Method* (Sec. II, ¶ 9).

The version printed in *The Friend* differs from the MS only in minor typographical matters and in the following :

MS ll. 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, "we"	<i>Friend</i> (1837) reads "I."
MS l. 12	<i>Friend</i> inserts after "let go" "as if the words of the charm had been incomplete, and it had appeared at its own will only to mock his calling."
MS l. 14, "this serious imperfection"	<i>Friend</i> reads "the imperfection in the annunciation of the idea."
MS l. 19, "a FACT"	<i>Friend</i> reads "the development of a fact."
MS ll. 22-4	<i>Friend</i> omits "and to the zealous Pupil . . . evidence."

Comparison with the text of the *Treatise* (see above, pp. 20-21) will show more differences. The second half of the paragraph, including the note, is greatly condensed, much material being omitted. The first half (to "we dare appeal") follows the MS very accurately, even to the phrase "finest elements of method" which *The Friend* revised. The only difference of any importance that occurs

in this half of the passage is the substitution in the *Treatise* of "multiplicity" for "manifoldness" (MS l. 3). This substitution would naturally have troubled Coleridge as it would any one familiar with the Kantian terminology.

One deleted passage in this MS should be reproduced here as it is interesting in itself and throws some light on the authenticity of a passage in the *Treatise* (Sec. I, ¶ 11) that does not appear in *The Friend*, stating the function of language in the development of the idea. At one stage of its composition the MS read, after the phrase "Comparative Anatomy," l. 9 :

"Still did he seem to miss the completing Word that should have reflected the Idea, and have placed it at the disposal of his own consciousness, for his distinct and voluntary contemplation. For the Word is the first Birth of the Idea, and it's flexible organ."

The manuscript is printed below as it was finally corrected by the author.

f. 78 r.

soon after the commencement of the latter half of the last Century, was falling abroad, weighed down and crushed as it were by the inordinate number and manifoldness of facts and phænomena apparently separate, without evincing the least promise of systematizing itself by any inward combination, any vital interdependence of it's parts. JOHN Hunter, who appeared at times almost a stranger to the grand Conception, which yet never ceased to work in him as his Genius and governing Spirit, rose at length in the Horizon of Physiology and Comparative Anatomy. In his printed Works the finest Elements of System seem evermore to flit before him, twice or thrice only to have been seized and after a momentary detention to have been again let go. At length in the astonishing preparation for his Museum he constructed it for the scientific apprehension out of the unspoken Alphabet of Nature. Yet notwithstanding this serious imperfection how exhilarating have been the results ! We dare appeal to ABERNETHIE, to EVERARD HOME, to HATCHETT, whose communication to Sir Everard on the egg and it's analogies in a recent paper of the latter (itself of highest excellence) in the Phil. Trans : we point out as being in the proper sense of the term a FACT in the History of Physiology, and to which we refer as exhibiting a

luminous instance of what we mean by the discovery of a *central Phenomenon*—To these we appeal, and to the zealous Pupil of John Hunter, to whom, as his announced Biographer, we entrust the detail of the evidence;—whether whatever is grandest in the views of CUVIER, is not either a reflection of this Light or a continuation of it's Rays, well and wisely directed thro' fit media to it's appropriate Object.¹

¹Nor should it be wholly unnoticed, that Cuvier, who, we understand, was not born in France and is not of unmixed French Extraction, had prepared himself for his illustrious labors (as we learn from a reference in the first Chapter of his great Work, and should have concluded from the general style of thinking, tho' the language betrays suppression as of one who doubted the sympathy of his Readers or audience) in a very different school of Methodology and Philosophy than Paris could have afforded.

(To be printed as a note; but at the bottom of the same Page.)

II. On Botany, f. 78 v.

Folio 78 *verso* contains simply two notes, the first marked for insertion after the words "revealed to Linnaeus" (*Friend*, Sec. II, Essay VI, ¶ 3; 1818, V, ¶ 8; Bohn, VI, ¶ 4; *Treatise*, "contemplated by Linnaeus," Sec. II, ¶ 10); the second marked as a substitution, evidently for some part of the passage "All that can be done . . ." (*Friend* and *Treatise* as above). Both were struck though as for deletion, but they are of some interest in connection with Coleridge's scientific studies and his attempts to relate science and philosophy. They are therefore reproduced.

f. 78 v.

Least of all, therefore, could he penetrate into the modification of each by the author [evidently meant for *other*], as the elementary principle of the sexual system, and the possible means of uniting an artificial with a natural classification.

all, that Glasses of higher and yet higher powers, the mere employment of which requires a long apprenticeship of the Eye (almost, it should seem, a special *Gift*)—all that microscopes and microscopic skill can detect,

III. On the Relations of Law and Theory, f. 79.

Folio 79, *recto and verso*, contains two fragments of attempts to define the two relations (of law and of theory) by means of which Coleridge distinguished and classified the various arts and sciences in the *Treatise on Method*. The idea of these fragments was developed in the *Treatise*, Sec. I, ¶¶ 6-14, and restated in Sec. III; and in *The Friend* in Sec. II, Essay V, ¶¶ 1-3, and Essay XI (1818, Essay X misprinted "IX") *passim*. In addition to these the folio contains (79 v.) an illustration from Milton apparently meant for insertion on some lost page of MS.

The opening of the second paragraph of 79 r. makes it seem probable that the draft was intended for the introductory *Treatise* rather than *The Friend*. It was essential that the introduction to the *Encyclopædia* should list all kinds of arts and sciences that such a work might be expected to include, or else explain the reasons for their omission; *The Friend*, using the arts and sciences more for purposes of incidental illustration, was not bound to account for omissions.

f. 79 v.

There is then a twofold Relation of Quality to Position; in the former it stands as a Consequent to an Antecedent. In the latter on the contrary the Quality determines the Position, either in order to [the production of *deleted*] some effect producible only by a given *degree* of force, which degree is again attainable only by an accumulation of Homogeneous Quantities, as in Steam, or Gunpowder, or the compound Lever—or for the purpose of generating some new power different in kind by interpenetration of opposites as for instance in the formation of Water, the Metallic Oxyds, and the Manifold inimitable Metamorphoses (we had almost said, Metempsychoses) of Natural Chemistry in the Educts and Products of the organic World.¹

[¹Note marked for insertion, but then deleted, reads in part as follows:] "As the first is the divine Relation, the ground, the law, and the condition of Method in the speculative Sciences with Theology as their Apex . . ."

The awful Truth, the Light, to which like a Plant in darkness the Imagination in all it's spiral rings and erring tendrils still returning on itself yet still is struggling toward, is worthily expressed in the lines of Milton—

O thou, my Word ! begotten Son ! by thee
This I perform : speak thou, and be it *done*.
My overshadowing Spirit and Might by thee
I send along : ride forth, and bid *the Deep*
Within *appointed* bounds *be* Heaven and Earth.
Boundless the Deep, because I AM who fill
Infinitude, nor vacuous the space.

Par. Lost. B. vii. l. 163.

f. 79 r.

As we may appropriately distinguish the first, as the *divine* Relation, the Idea of which in the mind is the Initiative, and the endless Evolution of which is itself the End, in and for which all the Facts of inward and outward Experience find their place and significance, and which therefore establishes the Method of all the speculative Sciences with Theology as their common Apex : may the Second be designated as the finite or creaturely Relation, which assigns the common principle of Method to all the practical Sciences, under which we here include all the Studies which tho' not yet principled into Sciences are seeking to become such (as Chemistry at present, and as Astronomy was before the labors of Kepler and Newton)—in short, to all the pursuits of Intellect which have Truth for their *immediate* Object, rather than Utility ¹ in the narrower sense of the word.

The Arts of immediate Utility, as Trades &c are of course not comprehended in this Disquisition, as their Methods, where not included in those of Taste and Science, are dependent on the ever varying nature of the materials & the purpose.

¹Note.

In the education of Gentlemen, that is, of Freemen par excellence, who (to adopt the language of the Platonic School) are to hold the same rank in the social State as the Ideas hold in the intellectual, the conviction that all Truth, as distinguished from accidental facts or occurrences, is useful in itself, and the faith, that all Truths will ultimately lead to practical results, tho' ages may intervene, should be among the first impressions made on the youthful mind. Lord Bacon with a profundity that belonged to himself, and the quaintness characteristic of his age, has observed—that Truth must be luciferous before it can be fructiferous : even as in the creation the Light was divided from the Darkness on the first day, and not framed into Suns, and Moons till the fourth.

IV. On the Fine Arts, f. 64.

Folio 64, bound not near the fragments on method reproduced above, but with fragments on the fine arts, contains in autograph some draft of the definition of the method of the fine arts that was given in both *The Friend* and the *Treatise*. *The Friend* (Sec. II, Essay VI, ¶ 2; 1818, Essay V) follows this MS fairly closely; the *Treatise* (Sec. III, ¶ 21) shows more variations. The term "poesy" is not used in either printed version, nor does either contain a note suggesting the use of the term for the fine arts; but the suggestion was made by Coleridge in his essay *On Poesy or Art* (*Biographia*, II, 255). The MS, excluding a section later crossed out, reads as follows:—

f. 64.

of the Idea, the Method is more or less perfect. Therefore it was that we spoke of Method in the fine Arts as belonging indeed to the second or external Relation, and yet as a transitional form connecting it with the first and with the hidden world; because tho' the Position of the Parts is in some degree influenced by their previous natures, yet in all that truly merits the name of Poetry¹ in its most comprehensive sense there is a necessary Predominance of the Idea, and a comparative Indifference of the Materials. A true musical Taste again is soon dissatisfied with the Harmonica, or similar Instrument of Glass or Steel, because the Body of the Sound (to adopt an Italian phrase) that effect, which is derived from the Materials, encroaches too far on the effect from the Proportions of the Notes, or that which is given to Music by the Mind.

(note at the bottom)

¹It were perhaps to be wished, that we should desynonymize the two words, Poetry and Poesy, by using the latter, as the generic name of all the fine Arts: for every work of Genius, containing the End in the Means, is a ποιησις, as distinguished from a mere συνταξις, or collocation for an external and conventional end.

V. On the Critics, ff. 80-82.

Folios 80-82, immediately following the fragments on method printed above, contain evidence of an attempt to insert in the *Treatise* a section on criticism. In writing this section Coleridge seems to have been carried away by his

feelings on the subject of periodical criticism (cf. Campbell's biography of Coleridge for his troubles with the critics at this time). He wrote an unrestrainedly violent attack, toned it down by deletion, tried several times to write a transitional paragraph that would make its insertion in the *Treatise* logical, and then crossed out even the final draft or (as on one page) otherwise marked it for omission. There is no value in reproducing the sentences that were early discarded or re-written by Coleridge ; but the latest and most complete draft is printed below as it was finally corrected by the author, since it refers very directly to the introductory *Treatise* of the *Encyclopædia*, thus helping establish the fact that there was a MS draft unlike *The Friend*, and since it has some intrinsic value for students of Coleridge.

To what purpose should we reason with a Critic, who without affording a single proof of his competence or perhaps in spite of the most glaring proofs to the contrary, (nay, in spite of his own consciousness that he has never made himself master even of the means of studying the question ;) will yet assure the Public, that a writer's arguments are nonsense and his inductions falsehoods? With a Critic, who neither in his Conscience nor in his modesty finds any *Veto* to the implied request, that his blank assertion, *aided only by the suppression of his name*, should be taken in evidence, that a Scholar, undeniably of regular education and studious habits, knows nothing or worse than nothing of a subject, to which he has avowedly devoted the larger and riper portion of his life? What can facts or logic avail with a Lurcher, whose only chance of making his periodical lampoons marketable rests on his sympathy with the ignorance of his Readers, or with the epidemic taste for private anecdote and personal in[n]juendo? Heaven has laid this peculiar curse, this special mark of it's anger, on Calumny, that it is difficult even to expose it without seeming to partake of it ! It is a Subject, of which both Justice and Policy exact the Anatomy, but which it is scarcely possible to dissect without risk of absorbing some *portiuuncula* of it's poison ; however truly the Anatomist might say as Democritus did to Hippocrates when the great Father of Medicine found him under the Plane Tree cutting up sundry wild beasts and venomous reptiles : *Hæc animalia, quæ vides, propterea seco, non Dei opera perosus sed bilis, fellis, et veneni naturam disquirens.*

But enough and more than enough of these men,
 Quibus loquacis affatim arrogantiae est,
 Peritiæ parum aut nihil,
 Nec ulla mica literarii salis ;
 Crumenimulga natio ;
 Lavernæ alumni, vel togati Vulteres !

Ja : Dousa : Epod. L II. Carm. 2,

as quoted in the *Anatomy of Melancholy*.

[See *Anatomy of Melancholy*, Part I, Section 2, Member III,
 Subsection 15. Coleridge had adapted as usual.]

who owe the notice here taken of them exclusively to the following considerations. First, the Interests of Many are concerned deeply in the great public Undertaking, to which the present Treatise is the Introduction and the Work itself must from it's very nature and extent rely in some measure for it's early support on the predispositions in it's behalf and the favorable anticipations of the Public. But this is the Bed, as it were, and dry Dock of the Vessel, which is to consociate the present Time with the wisdom, inventions, and examples of all former Ages ; and this it is which it is most difficult to protect from lurking Incendiaries, and where it is almost impossible to countermine at all points the *Hic et Ubique* Spirit of Mischief which would in vain attempt to check the Progress of a meritorious Work, once safely launched, and fully and fairly on it's Voyage. Secondly, it is the sound dictate of Prudence itself, it is the prescript of manly Policy, to proclaim and set at open defiance a

[MS torn]

nemy whose sworn and predetermined
 the performance could overpower, no
 Sufferance
 t of the writer could soften or
 conciliate
 have not extenuated the present
 dishonest
 of the periodical Press.

—so neither have we exaggerated it or “ set down aught in malice.” Against Falsehood either frontless and daring, or in it's yet baser form of mutilated truth, the best and only effective defence is the Truth itself, the whole Truth, and nothing but the Truth. Were it not for the jealous and ready ear which (such is the infirmity of our nature even in it's noblest specimens) even good and great men too often yield to idle or malignant Tale-bearers ; if each man of Genius and substantial Learning among us would repel every slanderous attack on the objects of his respect or admiration in the same spirit as he would desire to see his own fair claims vindicated ; if on every gross instance of wrong and insult to a chosen fellow-servan[t] the true Ministers of the Muses would each give out a public counter-declaration of his own opinion and judgement, these nuisances in the

republic of Letters, which in the degree and extent of their influence are *peculiar* to Great Britain, would be speedily abated; and Genius and Learning would need no further patronage, no other or more benign influences, than each star would receive from the friendly Rays of the Constellation, to which it belonged.

Lastly, we considered these remarks as closely connected with our Subject, and bearing at least the relation of a corollary or consectary to the main Disquisition: inasmuch as it is a truth of no difficult demonstration, that neither our literary or political Libellers could possess the influence, which it is too notorious that they now exert, but from the absence of all *principles*, and therefore of all safe and certain *rules*, of METHOD in the formation of the Reflection, the Taste, and the moral Tact as far as the great majority of English Readers are in question—from the methods, that are the Counterfeits and treacherous Substitutes of the one only true Method, in the education of the Mind, whether it take place under the superintendence of a Teacher, or have been left to the Individual's own Judgement and industry. For hence as from it's [end of the page and the fragment].

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